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Abstract 
Cyber-enabled systems are increasingly ubiquitous and interconnected, showing up in 
traditional enterprise settings as well as increasingly diverse contexts, including critical infra-
structure, avionics, cars, smartphones, home automation, and medical devices. Meanwhile, the 
impact of cyber attacks against these systems on our missions, business objectives, and per-
sonal lives has never been greater. Despite these stakes, the analysis of cyber risk and mitiga-
tions to that risk tends to be a subjective, labor-intensive, and costly endeavor, with results 
that can be as suspect as they are perishable. We identified the following gaps in those risk re-
sults: concerns for (1) their repeatability/reproducibility, (2) the time required to obtain them, 
and (3) the completeness of the analysis per the degree of attack surface coverage.  
In this dissertation, we consider whether it is possible to make progress in addressing 
these gaps with the introduction of a new artifact called “BluGen.” BluGen is an automated 
platform for cyber risk assessment that employs a set of new risk analytics together with a 
highly-structured underlying cyber knowledge management repository. 
To help evaluate the hypotheses tied to the gaps identified, we conducted a study com-
paring BluGen to a cyber risk assessment methodology called EVRA. EVRA is representative 
of current practice and has been applied extensively over the past eight years to both fielded 
systems and systems under design. We used Design Science principles in the construction and 
investigation of BluGen, during which we considered each of the three gaps. 
The results of our investigation found support for the hypotheses tied to the gaps that 
BluGen is designed to address. Specifically, BluGen helps address the first gap by virtue of its 
methods/analytics executing as deterministic, automated processes. In the same way, BluGen 
helps address the second gap by producing its results at machine speeds in no worse than 
quadratic time complexity, seconds in this case. This result compares to the 25 hours that the 
EVRA team required to perform the same analysis. BluGen helps to address the third gap via 
its use of an underlying knowledge repository of cyber-related threats, mappings of those 
threats to cyber assets, and mappings of mitigations to the threats. The results show that man-
ual analysis using EVRA covered about 12% of the attack surface considered by BluGen. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Background of the Problem 
Merriam-Webster defines cyber as "of, relating to, or involving computers or com-
puter networks (such as the Internet)"  (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). A closely related term, cyber-
space, is defined as: “A global domain within the information environment consisting of the 
interdependent network of information systems infrastructures including the Internet, tele-
communications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.” 
(Committee on National Security Systems, 2010). Today cyber is ubiquitous; we interact with 
it daily via smartphones, tablets, and laptops, but it is also all around us in critical infrastruc-
ture, avionics, automobiles, manufacturing robots, and "Internet of Things" (Xia, Yang, 
Wang, & Vinel, 2012) components, such as medical devices, fitness bracelets, electronic as-
sistants (e.g., Alexa, Siri, Cortana (Heater, 2017)), children's toys, thermostats, and even light 
bulbs. The software in cyber devices is ever more sophisticated, visualizing protein structures, 
recognizing faces, translating languages, predicting credit-worthiness, and diagnosing dis-
eases. 
While the benefits of applying cyber are significant and growing, so too are the associ-
ated risks. Cyber attacks can manifest in many forms, such as identify theft, intellectual prop-
erty theft, ransomware, and website denial of service. They can be triggered, often anony-
mously, from great distances, as cyber-enabled devices of all stripes are increasingly intercon-
nected across the globe. Experts especially worry about attacks with societal consequences, 
such as attacks on voting machines, the electrical power grid, transportation systems, govern-
ment services, and military systems. Along these lines, adverse events, and adverse cyber 
events in particular, can lead to high consequence impacts, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Span of Adverse Events (Rausand, 2011) 
The United States Government has grown more concerned about the cyber threat, in-
cluding within the military, as evidenced by Section 1647 of the 2016 National Defense Au-
thorization Act (NDAA) (Congress, 2016) (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Excerpt from 2016 Section 1647 
Perhaps Congress was motivated by the 2013 Defense Science Board report titled "Re-
silient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat" (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013), which 
stated: 
The United States cannot be confident that our critical Information Technol-
ogy (IT) systems will work under attack from a sophisticated and well-resourced op-
ponent utilizing cyber capabilities in combination with all of their military and intelli-
gence capabilities. 
Regrettably, one might reasonably conclude from the headlines that little has funda-
mentally changed in the ensuing five years, making the quote as true today as when originally 
written. Indeed, by nearly any measure, the magnitude of the problem has become staggering. 
Cybersecurity Ventures estimates that cyber crime will cost the world $6 trillion annually by 
2021 and that $1 trillion will be spent globally on cybersecurity from 2017 to 2021 
(Cybersecurity Ventures, 2016). 
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Against this backdrop, organizations that employ cyber systems to help meet their 
business/mission objectives1 are concerned about the degree to which cyber attacks can put 
those objectives at risk. Specifically, with respect to the growing cyber threat, they are inter-
ested in answers to a range of questions, such as the following: 
• What is my mission risk due to cyber and what mitigations help manage that risk? 
• Will the mission survive? Should I limit the use of cyber in the most critical cases? 
• As threats, missions, and cyber systems all evolve, how does mission risk change? 
• How much risk reduction can be achieved for a given funding level? 
Security Architects (SAs) (Newhouse, Keith, Scribner, & Witte, 2017) are on the 
front-line attempting to help answer such questions. SAs work with other stakeholders, such 
as managers, mission owners, system owners, other systems engineers, and end users, to make 
the best decisions possible based on the assessed risk and other considerations, such as fund-
ing levels available. SAs typically employ risk assessment methodologies and associated tools 
to help answer these questions, drawing on others for information required by the assessment 
process.  
A primary output of the risk assessment process is a risk plot, e.g., Figure 3. The plot-
ted data points represent cyber events, such as cyber attacks. Note the ordinal, six-point Lik-
ert-style (McLeod, 2008) scale used for each axis in this particular representation. The precise 
visual depiction of the risk can vary across risk assessment methodologies, but it usually high-
lights potential cyber events (e.g., attacks) against cyber-enabled components scored by mis-
sion impact (also called "criticality" or "consequence;" we use these terms interchangeably) 
and likelihood of occurrence/probability of success. 
                                                 
1 Henceforth, this document uses the term ‘mission’ to cover an organization’s business and mission 
objectives. We note that in government settings, especially the military, the term ‘mission’ is commonly used. 
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Figure 3: Typical Risk Plot (InsurTech, 2017) 
Statement of the Problem  
While the SA’s are Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in cyber, their decision-making in 
risk assessment context is often subjective and variable, leading to concerns about the rigor, 
repeatability, and reproducibility of the assessed risk and associated mitigation recommenda-
tions (Peacos, 2016), (Hallberg, Bengtsson, Hallberg, Karlzén, & Sommestad, 2017). Other 
concerns include the time and expense required to conduct such assessments. These issues be-
come even more significant given the need to periodically repeat assessments based on the 
evolution of the (1) anticipated threat, (2) cyber-dependent missions, and (3) supporting cyber 
systems. In addition, there is growing interest in producing "real time" risk assessment 
measures for critical systems, making manual assessment unrealistic. Meanwhile, the event-
centric approach so commonly employed for cyber risk analysis today has limitations, as cap-
tured in part by Aven (Aven, 2016): 
Traditional risk assessments are based on causal chains and event analysis, 
failure reporting and risk assessments, calculating historical data-based probabili-
ties. This approach has strong limitations in analyzing complex systems as they treat 
the system as being composed of components with linear interactions, using methods 
like fault trees and event trees, and have mainly a historical failure data perspective. 
An additional concern is the need to systematically and objectively identify mitiga-
tions that, if implemented, would reduce risk to an acceptable level. Mitigation analysis that is 
informed by assessed risk and tolerance to that risk is commonly included in the risk evalua-
tion treatment phases of risk analysis. Similar to the scoring of risk, mitigation analysis is typ-
ically conducted manually.  
5 
 
Taken together, the concerns discussed above define a gap that the cybersecurity com-
munity has historically struggled to address. We return to and expand on these themes in the 
Literature Review section below. 
Research Question 
The research question that we pose in this document is as follows: Is there a new ap-
proach to mission-cyber risk assessment that can significantly close the following gaps: im-
proved repeatability and reproducibility of results ("repeatability/reproducibility gap"), im-
proved coverage of the attack surface analyzed ("coverage gap"), and decreased analyst time 
required ("time gap")? 
Objective of the project 
The objective of the project is to determine the extent to which the gaps mentioned 
above are addressed by a new approach to assessing mission risk due to cyber effects called 
“BluGen” (Llanso, McNeil, Pearson, & Moore, 2017)(McNeil, Llanso, & Pearson, 2018). 
Specifically, the project assesses the degree to which BluGen provides greater coverage of the 
attack surface and requires less overall SA time to execute for a target cyber system to be ana-
lyzed. These time and coverage results are compared to the same results for a representative 
"first generation" manually-executed, event-centric risk assessment methodology. The project 
deliverables consist of coverage comparisons, timing comparisons, and an analysis of the ex-
tent to which the results support the hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
We begin the literature review with a basic definition of ‘risk’ and then move on to 
discuss risk assessment methodologies. The methodology section covers four major catego-
ries: compliance-centric, event-centric, loss-centric, and capability-centric. Finally, the review 
discusses related, cross-cutting topics relevant to cyber risk assessment: mitigation analysis, 
vulnerability enumeration, human variability in expert scoring, and knowledge management. 
Definition of Risk 
The assessment and management of risk have been studied for many decades and for 
many domains beyond cyber, including finance, insurance, healthcare, and military domains 
including kinetic attack, radiation, and electromagnetic jamming. Despite this long history, 
there remains a lack of consensus on a single definition of risk. As Kaplan stated in 1997 
(Kaplan, 1997):  
“Many of you remember that when our Society for Risk Analysis was brand 
new, one of the first things it did was to establish a committee to define the word 
'risk.' This committee labored for 4 years and then gave up, saying in its final report, 
that maybe it's better not to define risk. Let each author define it in his own way, only 
please each should explain clearly what way that is.” 
Consistent with the quote above, we find many risk definitions in use (Table 1). We 
note, however, that the definitions all have in common a degree of likelihood or uncertainty 
with respect to potentially adverse events. 
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Table 1: Examples of Risk Definitions 
Source Definition 
NIST 
“A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential 
circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts 
that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood 
of occurrence.” (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012) 
ISO 3100 
“Effect of uncertainty on objectives” (International Standards 
Organization, 2009) 
Merriam 
Webster 
“Possibility of loss or injury” (“Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,” 
n.d.) 
Investopedia 
“The chance that an investment's actual return will be different than ex-
pected.” (Investopedia Staff, n.d.) 
Society for 
Risk Analysis 
“Possibility of an unfortunate occurrence” (Various, n.d.) 
The seminal 1981 paper by Kaplan and Garrick, "On the Quantitative Definition of 
Risk" (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981) captured the essence of these definitions in a more formal 
way, as follows:   
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = {< 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖, 𝑥𝑖 >} 
In this definition, risk is a set of 𝑁 events, where an event is represented as a 3-tuple, 
< 𝑠𝑖, 𝑝𝑖, 𝑥𝑖 >, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁. 𝑠𝑖 is a scenario (event/attack), 𝑝𝑖 is the probability of 𝑠𝑖 occurring 
over some defined period of time, and 𝑥𝑖 is the consequence (impact) of 𝑠𝑖 occurring. 
Risk Methodologies 
Many existing cyber-related risk methodologies implicitly or explicitly define risk in a 
manner consistent with the risk definition above, which we call event-centric. In addition to 
event-centric methodologies, we define three other categories of risk-related methodologies: 
compliance-centric, loss-centric, and capability-centric. Below, we discuss each of these cate-
gories, which are not completely orthogonal from one another, and we provide representative 
examples of each. 
Compliance-Centric Risk Methods 
Compliance-centric risk methodologies help organizations comply with policies, such 
as the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) (House Government Reform 
8 
 
Committee, 2002) and the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8510.01 (US 
Department of Defense, 2014). One such methodology that directly supports compliance is 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-37, titled 
"Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework [RMF] to Federal Information Sys-
tems: a Security Life Cycle Approach" (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2010). 
When applying RMF, one undertakes six major steps: (1) categorize an information 
system, (2) select security controls, (3) implement security controls, (4) assess security con-
trols, (5) authorize the information system, and (6) monitor security controls. Risk is analyzed 
by considering mission impacts of cyber events in step (1). In step (1), the RMF references 
two documents to assist in Information System categorization: The Federal Information Pro-
cessing System Publication 199, "Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Infor-
mation and Information System" (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
2004) and the NIST Special Publication 800-60, "Guide for Mapping Types of Information 
and Information Systems to Security Categories" (Stine, Kissel, Barker, Fahlsing, & Gulick, 
2008). Also, in step (1), one analyzes the potential loss of confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability (C/I/A) of information of various types in a target system and rates the corresponding 
mission/business impacts due to such a loss along an ordinal scale of Low, Moderate, and 
High. One then takes the high-water mark rating across all information types as the overall 
system categorization for the particular loss of C, I, or A. DoDI 8510.01 adopts the NIST 
RMF, but makes modifications, such as the requirement to use the Committee for National 
Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction 1253, "Security Categorization and Control Selection 
for National Security Systems" (CNSS Instruction No. 1253 - Security Categorization and 
Control Selection for National Security Systems, Version 2, 2012). CNSS is similar in concept 
to FIPS-199.  
Discussion. Compliance-centric risk-related methodologies tend to treat risk at a high 
level. For example, CNSS-1253 considers risk in terms of mission impact/criticality only 
without regard to the fact that impacts resulting from a compromise of C/I/A can vary for the 
same mission information across different components of the system and at different times in 
a given mission time-line. Distinct components might benefit from different mitigation strate-
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gies, but the analysis is too high level to differentiate. In addition, CNSS-1253 selects mitiga-
tions via lookup tables based on a high-level categorization process. If used alone without a 
deeper consideration of the full range of risk elements (e.g., threat capabilities, missions, sys-
tem components, defense capabilities, and mappings among them), one may end up unwit-
tingly over-protecting less important assets, under-protecting more important assets, poten-
tially wasting funds and subsequently imperiling missions. Similar compliance approaches are 
in use in non-government settings. For example, the Payment Card Industry Security Stand-
ards Council (Orfei, Leach, King, Mauro, & Fitzsimmons, 2006), have likewise encouraged a 
compliance-oriented approach to security with their PCI-DSS security standard. 
Event-Centric Methods 
Event-centric methods analyze risk by enumerating potential cyber events, such as 
malicious cyber attacks, and scoring risk as a function of (a) mission impact/criticality and 
(b) likelihood of occurrence or estimated level of effort to carry out. An event can be mali-
cious (e.g., cyber attack) or non-malicious (e.g., operator error, software error, an earthquake 
that knocks out electrical power to cyber components). Perhaps the most prominent example 
of an event-centric methodology is NIST Special Publication 800-30, "Guide for Conducting 
Risk Assessments" (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012), summarized in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: NIST 800-30 Risk Assessment Framework 
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Other examples of event-centric approaches include the International Standards Or-
ganization 27001 Risk Analysis process (ISO/IEC 27001:2013 - Information technology, 
Security techniques, Information security Management systems, Requirements, 2013), Factor 
Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) (Carlson, Hutton, & Gilliam, 2010), and the Carnegie 
Mellon Software Engineering Institute’s Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerabil-
ity Evaluation (OCTAVE) methodology (Caralli, Stevens, Young, & Wilson, 2007). 
Discussion. There are several challenges with conducting event-centric assessments, 
as typically practiced today. Such approaches usually require mission and SAs to manually 
score mission impact/criticality and attack likelihood, respectively. However, manual scoring 
does not scale well due to the combinatoric explosion that results when one attempts to enu-
merate all possible attack sequences that could be applied to a target system. For example, at-
tack-based risk analysis of a system of 5 mission threads, 40 nodes (computing devices of var-
ious types), 3 data items per node on average, 4 attack vectors, and 3 attack effects can require 
an upper bound of 7,200 (5 × 40 × 3 × 4 × 3) unique attack contexts that SAs must score 
for impact and likelihood. 
As a result of this combinatoric explosion, SAs tend to consider just a portion of the 
attack surface by using small, commonly non-random samples, with attendant concerns about 
how well such samples generalize to the entire attack surface. The result is limited attack sur-
face coverage. Also, such assessments are time consuming and subject to the effects of SA-
bias in assigning scores along ordinal scales. Furthermore, the repeatability and reproducibil-
ity of such analyses are a concern. While modest progress has been made in automating im-
pact scoring, e.g., (Musman, Tanner, Temin, Elsaesser, & Loren, 2011) and (Llanso & Klatt, 
2014), approaches to automating full attack likelihood scoring remain in their infancy. Lastly, 
to-date there is no clear-cut automation path that leads from attack-centric risk assessment to 
mitigation analysis, though some related work is going on in this area (Vigo, Nielson, & 
Nielson, 2014). 
Loss-Centric Risk Methods 
Loss-centric methodologies are similar to event-centric methodologies described 
above but are more focused on quantifying dollar losses due to cyber events rather than on as-
11 
 
sessing potential mission impacts. Two representative examples of such methodologies in-
clude the approach described by Seiersen and Hubbard in their book, "How to Measure Any-
thing in Cybersecurity Risk" (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016) and INFOSEC Institute's "Quantita-
tive Risk Analysis" method (INFOSEC Institute, 2013). In the latter, one determines potential 
annualized losses to attacks on assets. The key formula in methods similar to INFOSEC Insti-
tute's method is 𝐴𝐿𝐸 = 𝑆𝐿𝐸 × 𝐴𝑅𝑂, where 𝐴𝐿𝐸 is Annualized Loss Expectancy, 𝑆𝐿𝐸 is Sin-
gle Loss Expectancy, and 𝐴𝑅𝑂 is Annualized Rate of Occurrence. In turn, 𝑆𝐿𝐸 = 𝐴𝑉 × 𝐸𝐹, 
where 𝐴𝑉 is asset value and 𝐸𝐹 is exposure factor (percent of asset affected by a cyber at-
tack). 
Discussion. While potential dollar loss is certainly a reasonable focus for risk, loss-
centric methods that approach risk analysis via event enumeration suffer from the same issues 
as the more mission-focused event-centric methodologies discussed above. Another challenge 
with such methods is in accumulating enough data to make credible estimates of, for example, 
ARO and EF. Finally, such methods do not apply as well in situations, such as national de-
fense, where the focus is less about dollar loss and more about mission success and lives 
saved. 
Capability-Centric Methods 
The capability-centric approach represents a recent departure from the more common 
event-centric risk approaches. The idea is as follows: rather than attempting to enumerate and 
analyze all of the attacks that an adversary might compose from their list of offensive capabil-
ities, the analyst instead focuses on the base capabilities themselves. For each offensive capa-
bility, the analyst identifies potential defensive capabilities that could effectively mitigate the 
offensive capability. Examples of offensive and defensive capabilities at different abstraction 
levels are given in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Examples of Offensive and Defensive Capabilities 
Level Example Offensive Capability Example Related Defensive Capability 
1  Threaten system availability Defend system availability 
2  Inject stealthy software implants 
Detect and block most stealthy implants via 
software whitelisting 
3 
 Software implants are injected via 
air gap jumping methods  
Establish an authoritative repository of 
cryptographic hashes of authorized software 
Two example approaches that employ the capability-centric approach are BluGen 
(Llanso et al., 2017), the focus of this dissertation proposal, and the capability-based approach 
employed by the government program called "NIPRNet/SIPRNet Cyber Security Architecture 
Review" (NSCSAR) (Dinsmore, 2016)2. BluGen is discussed in greater detail below. 
NSCSAR focuses on common infrastructure assets used by many missions and considers the 
degree of exposure of such assets to the anticipated threat, omitting mission impact/criticality 
considerations. 
Discussion. The central hypothesis of the capability-based approach is as follows: as 
the individual capabilities possessed by an anticipated adversary are mitigated by cyber de-
fenders using their own "defensive" capabilities, it becomes increasingly difficult for that ad-
versary to compose viable attack sequences, because there are fewer and fewer remaining un-
mitigated "defensive" capabilities from which to compose such attacks. Of course, implicit in 
this statement is the ability to enumerate the capabilities of the anticipated adversary in the 
first place, but we believe that this is a more tractable challenge than, for example, enumerat-
ing all possible attacks that one could compose from the base capabilities. The 2015 threat 
model (DoD, 2015) created for DoD provides an example of capability enumeration for the 
six cyber attacker tiers defined by Gosler and Von Thaer (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013). 
                                                 
2 The program name recently changed from NSCSAR to DoDCAR. 
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Other Related Work 
This subsection covers other related work relevant to cyber risk assessment, specifi-
cally mitigation analysis, vulnerability enumeration, human variability in expert scoring, and 
knowledge management. 
Mitigation Analysis 
Once risk has been assessed, an important next step in the risk assessment and man-
agement realm is risk treatment, which examines potential mitigations (also known as coun-
termeasures or security controls) to help manage risk. Representative examples include: 
• Step 2 of the Risk Management Framework (RMF) (NIST, 2010) 
• Step 4 of ISO 31000  (International Standards Organization, 2009)  
• Step 8 of OCTAVE (Caralli et al., 2007) 
• Step 2.1.2 of MITRE’s Threat Assessment & Remediation Analysis (TARA) 
(Wynn, Whitmore, Upton, & Spriggs, 2011)) 
When looking across these steps, we find that they tend to be conducted manually to 
one degree or another. For example, CNSS-1253 (CNSS Instruction No. 1253 - Security 
Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems, Version 2, 2012), which 
is a recommended approach for realizing RMF step 2, takes a hybrid approach, where the SA 
consults a large security control table (Table D-1 of Appendix D, Security Control Tables) 
and mechanically gathers a list of the mapped security controls specified for given levels of 
mission impact based on breaches of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Such map-
pings can be blunt instruments, requiring further SA analysis. The SA then considers possible 
application of “overlays” (list of controls recommended for particular circumstances, such as 
systems that include cross domain solutions or that process classified information). Next the 
SA revises the list (additions/deletions) based on local needs and maps the controls to applica-
ble assets in the target system. An important part of mitigation analysis is consideration of the 
larger tradespace of cost vs. benefit. The primary benefit is the degree of risk reduction result-
ing from mitigation. Cost can include a complex set of factors, such as the cost to acquire, in-
tegrate, and operate mitigations. Cost can also include negative impacts to the missions of the 
system caused by use of the mitigations. An extreme illustration of a negative impact would 
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be applying a screen saver that requires a password to an airliner flight deck display. Clearly, 
such a mitigation could be disastrous during operations such as landing. Tradespace analysis 
has received some attention in the literature, including work by Dewri, et al. (Dewri, 
Poolsappasit, Ray, & Whitley, 2007) and Yevseyeva (Yevseyeva, Basto-Fernandes, 
Emmerich, & van Moorsel, 2015). Dewri takes a multi-objective optimization approach based 
on attack tree, whereas Yevseyeva employs ideas from portfolio optimization to select secu-
rity controls. The BluGen team is in the process of considering potential application of genetic 
algorithms to help search the tradespace of possible security architectures (no published work 
yet). 
Vulnerability Enumeration 
Event-centric and loss-centric risk approaches discussed above depend upon the con-
cept of vulnerability enumeration. By vulnerability enumeration, we mean attempting to iden-
tify and analyze all the vulnerabilities in a target system. For example, the “Conduct Assess-
ment” step of NIST 800-30 (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012), the Risk 
Identification step of ISO 31000 (International Standards Organization, 2009), and phase 2 of 
OCTAVE (Caralli et al., 2007) all attempt some form of vulnerability enumeration. While the 
idea of vulnerability enumeration appeals to the intuition, we assert that for complex cyber en-
vironments, attempts at enumerating vulnerabilities will generally fall well short of the total 
possible set. Therefore, the majority of events that depend on vulnerability enumeration in tar-
get systems will not be identified and the related assessment results will thus be incomplete. 
Undercounts result from the failure to consider exploitation events tied to so-called "zero day" 
vulnerabilities, that is, vulnerabilities that are known to only a few or not yet known by any-
one. Underlying this viewpoint is the paper "Estimating Software Vulnerability Counts in the 
Context of Cyber Risk Assessments" (Llanso & McNeil, 2018), which analyzes vulnerability 
discovery rates and the rate of flaw and related vulnerability introduction during the develop-
ment cycle. The paper combines the two rates in an equation that estimates the number of un-
known vulnerabilities as a percentage of total vulnerabilities. The results are not encouraging, 
with greater than 50 percent of vulnerabilities remaining latent. 
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Human Variability in Expert Scoring 
A theme running through the event-centric and loss-centric risk assessment methods 
discussed earlier in this section is the routine use of human experts to enumerate events and 
then score those events for likelihood of occurrence and mission impact. Using humans for 
this purpose leads to concerns about repeatability and reproducibility of the results. The 
phrase "inter-rater reliability" is used in the literature (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008) to refer to 
this issue. As Trochim states: 
“Whenever you use humans as a part of your measurement procedure, you 
have to worry about whether the results you get are reliable or consistent. People are 
notorious for their inconsistency. We are easily distractible. We get tired of doing re-
petitive tasks. We daydream. We misinterpret.” 
While inter-rater reliability has been studied in general settings (Holm, Sommestad, 
Ekstedt, & Honeth, 2014), (Bolger & Wright, 1994), we focus here on the risk assessment 
context. Hallberg and his colleagues (Hallberg et al., 2017) studied inter-rater reliability with 
respect to humans manually scoring the probability and severity of cyber events or incidents. 
Their study involved 20 raters who scored 105 cyber incidents. After analyzing the results, the 
researchers concluded that: 
"The ratings of probability and severity are not reliable enough between 
raters to be considered a sound basis for the quantification of information security 
risks." 
Knowledge Management 
The discipline of knowledge management (KM) appears to have great potential in the 
area of cyber risk assessment. Becerra-Fernández and Sabherwal (Becerra-Fernandez & 
Sabherwal, 2010) define knowledge in a given area as “justified beliefs about relationships 
among concepts relevant to that particular area.” Those same authors define knowledge man-
agement, in turn, as “doing what is needed to get the most out of knowledge resources.” Ac-
tivities include the creating, updating, distributing, and employing of knowledge to help ad-
dress organizational challenges, or, alternatively, per O’Dell and Hubert (O’Dell & Hubert, 
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2011), “knowledge management is a systematic effort to enable information and knowledge to 
grow, flow, and create value.” 
We see the beginnings of knowledge management in cybersecurity that is relevant to 
cyber risk assessment. For example, Llansó (Llanso & Engebretson, 2016) defined a model, a 
subset of which is shown in Figure 5, that captures the details of and relationships between 
cyber systems, the missions they support, and the cyber threats to which they are exposed. 
The model, expressed in the Unified Modeling Language (Object Management Group, 1999), 
captures cyber-related knowledge in six different segments of a unified model. This model 
was highly influential in the development of the BluGen Reference Catalog (RefCat) dis-
cussed in this dissertation.  
 
Figure 5: Unified Model for System Security Engineering (UAMSSE) subset 
Other cybersecurity models that contribute to the area of knowledge management in 
cybersecurity include the following: 
• D’Amico, Goodall, and Kopylec (Goodall, D’Amico, & Kopylec, 2009) defined a cy-
bersecurity-related model, specifically an ontology that facilitates the mapping of 
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cyber assets to the missions they support and the identification of users who employ 
the systems composed of those assets.  
• NIST’s Special Publication 800-53 (National Institute of Standards and Technology 
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4, 2013) enumerates several hundred security 
controls intended to be used as mitigations to cyber threats. 800-53 plays a key role in 
the Risk Management Framework (NIST, 2010).  
• MITRE’s Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) (Mitre, 
n.d.) repository is a rich inventory of cyber attack patterns.  
• The National Vulnerability Database (NVD, n.d.) is a highly structured inventory of 
known vulnerabilities affecting cyber systems.  
• MITRE’s Mission Assurance Engineering (MAE) (Wynn et al., 2011) model maps 
mitigations to threats (threats are expressed as TTPs (techniques, tactics, and proce-
dures)) (Figure 6). The model also maps TTPs to asset classes. At a high level, MAE 
has conceptual similarities to the BluGen RefCat, discussed later. 
 
Figure 6: MITRE Mission Assurance Engineering (MAE) Data Model 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the research methodology used, including the placement of 
BluGen in a Design Science research context, the hypotheses underlying BluGen, the BluGen 
artifacts themselves, and how we explored those hypotheses. Chapter 4 then presents the re-
sults of that exploration. 
Design Science Research 
Hevner, et al. (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004) state that “Design science... cre-
ates and evaluates IT artifacts intended to solve identified organizational problems.” Vaish-
navi and Kuechler (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2011) describe Design Science research as “the 
creation of new knowledge through design of novel or innovative artifacts.” As BluGen con-
sists of a set of designed artifacts, we therefore describe and evaluate BluGen with Design 
Science Research (DSR) principles in mind.  
While different authors approach DSR in different ways, this dissertation adopts the 
approach described by Peffers, et al., in the 2007 paper titled “A Design Science Research 
Methodology for Information Systems Research” (Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, & 
Chatterjee, 2007). We follow the process in Figure 1, “DSRM Process Model” of that paper, 
repeated for convenience in Figure 7 below. Our entry point is “Problem-Centered Initiation.” 
With the problem defined, my research team has been and continues to be in the process of 
iterating through the steps of that model, which is expected to continue well beyond the time-
line of this dissertation. The research behind this dissertation, which has a strong emphasis on 
the Demonstration and Evaluation phases of Peffers. This dissertation along with other 
BluGen research already published (Llanso et al., 2017)(McNeil et al., 2018) represents the 
Communication portion of the Peffer’s Design Science Research Methodology model. 
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Figure 7: Peffers DSRM Process Model 
Theory 
As stated earlier, this dissertation centers on BluGen and its evaluation. The hypothe-
ses in Table 3 underlie BluGen. See Figure 8 to place artifacts mentioned in the hypotheses 
below into an architectural context. The dissertation focuses on hypotheses H1, H2, and H3. 
The other hypotheses are out of scope and are only included to give the reader a sense of the 
larger research agenda. 
Table 3: BluGen Hypotheses 
ID Hypothesis Summary 
H1 BluGen results are more repeatable and reproducible compared to manual, event-centric 
methods. 
H2 BluGen requires less analyst time compared to manual, event-centric methods. 
H3 BluGen provides greater attack surface coverage compared to manual, event-centric meth-
ods. 
H4 Exposure is positively correlated with probability of successful attack.  
H5 The following BluGen artifacts have utility to the SA: overall BluGen instantiation, Exposure 
method, Criticality method, and Mitigation method. 
H6 Capability enumeration has utility. 
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Artifact Design 
In this section, we describe the BluGen artifact design. Figure 8 presents a high level 
architectural view of BluGen. In summary, BluGen is designed as an assistant to the SA and 
consists of a set of analytic processes and an underlying database called the Reference Cata-
log (RefCat). To analyze a system for risk and potential mitigations to help manage that risk, 
the SA prepares a dataset called a "project" that captures essential details about the system to 
be analyzed and parameters that drive its analysis for risk. The SA submits the project as input 
to the BluGen software. BluGen analytics cross reference data in the project and RefCat to 
prepare two major outputs: a risk scatter plot and a report of suggested mitigations (see Table 
2 for examples of mitigations). 
 
Figure 8: BluGen Architecture 
BluGen consists of a number of artifacts, as summarized in Table 4. Below we discuss 
each of the artifacts using a description adapted and updated from (Llanso et al., 2017). 
Table 4: BluGen Artifacts 
Artifact Summary 
Framework BluGen itself 
Models Project and Reference Catalog (RefCat) 
Methods Exposure, Criticality, Mitigation Selection3 
Instantiation Java-based instantiation of the BluGen framework 
                                                 
3 Note that BluGen uses the term ‘analytic’ to refer to the Design Science concept of ‘method’. 
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Framework 
The BluGen framework is the conceptual structure for the capability-based approach 
for assessing risk and recommending mitigations. 
Models 
BluGen models consist of the project model and the Reference Catalog model. 
Project Model 
The project model describes the target cyber environment to be assessed by BluGen 
and contains three key sets: (1) M, a set of missions; (2) A, a set of assets; and (3) D, a set of 
data types. The assets in A support the missions in M by processing data in D. Data is subject 
to compromise possibilities in C, a set of fixed compromise possibilities discussed below. We 
follow the convention that variables 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝑙 index objects from M, A, D, and C respectively, 
under the following four constraints: 
• 𝑚𝑖 ∈ 𝑀, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ |𝑀| 
• 𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝐴, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝐴| 
• 𝑑𝑘 ∈ 𝐷, 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ |𝐷| 
• 𝑐𝑙 ∈ 𝐶, 1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ |𝐶| 
Each asset instance, 𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝐴, consists of a name, an optional description, an asset type, 
and a set of defensive capabilities that have already been mapped to the asset. The asset type 
must map onto one of the asset types found in the RefCat model (discussed below). If a new 
asset type is encountered that is not in the RefCat, it must be added and mapped accordingly. 
For missions, the environment description includes the overall weight of each mission relative 
to the other directly supported missions; weights are typically determined by mission and sys-
tem experts working together. Mission weights should sum to 1.0 for a given Project model 
instance. 
The criticality component of the Project model consists of a set of "raw" criticality 4-
tuples. Each criticality 4-tuple, (𝑚𝑖,𝑎𝑗 , 𝑑𝑘, 𝑐𝑙), is a unique combination of four values: a given 
mission, m, a given asset, a, a given mission data type, d, and a given compromise type, c, 
22 
 
chosen from the set {𝐶𝑂, 𝐼𝑁, 𝐴𝑉} where 𝐶𝑂 represents a breach of confidentiality, 𝐼𝑁 repre-
sents a breach of integrity, and 𝐴𝑉 represents a breach of availability. Note that not every pos-
sible 4-tuple in the Cartesian product of  𝑀 × 𝐴 × 𝐷 × 𝐶 represents a viable combination, as 
not every data type is associated with every asset, and not every asset is associated with every 
mission. Thus, the Cartesian product is an upper bound for the number of tuples required. 
Associated with each raw criticality 4-tuple is a score expressed in the range 0.0 to 
1.0, with 0.0 meaning not mission-critical at all and 1.0 meaning maximal mission criticality, 
the worst-case mission impact ("mission kill") if a cyber compromise were to occur in the 
context defined by the triple. For example, one of many criticality triples for a robot might be: 
(mission=navigate, asset=sensor, data=location, effect=integrity (IV)) and the worst-case im-
pact for the 4-tuple might be found to be 1.0. 
BluGen does not prescribe how raw criticality scores are derived; the scores could be 
manually assigned by mission experts or they could be generated by a mission/cyber perfor-
mance simulation that can induce simulated cyber effects and automatically determine related 
mission impacts, e.g., (Llanso & Klatt, 2014). The former would typically provide scores 
along an ordinal scale, while the latter would typically provide scores along a ratio scale 
based on mission performance metrics. The latter is more desirable to help minimize potential 
SA bias. 
Reference Catalog (RefCat) Model 
The purpose of the BluGen RefCat model is to capture peer-reviewed cyber- and cy-
bersecurity-related knowledge and make it available for reuse. The BluGen software uses the 
RefCat along with details about a given target mission/system environment to assess mission 
risk due to cyber effects (e.g., malicious cyber attacks, human error, acts of nature) and to rec-
ommend related mitigations based on a stated threat and risk tolerance. In the realm of 
knowledge management, the RefCat can be categorized as a knowledge sharing system (Alavi 
& Leidner, 2001). 
The RefCat is a machine-readable repository of cyber knowledge consisting of five 
primary classes of objects, as follows: (1) a taxonomy of entity types, (2) a set of offensive ca-
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pabilities that threaten those entity types, (3) a set of defensive solutions that can mitigate of-
fensive capabilities, (4) a set of defensive capabilities from which one composes defensive so-
lutions, and (5) Relationships among the above items. In particular, relationships are many-to-
many mappings between offensive capabilities and entity types, defensive solutions and of-
fensive capabilities, and defensive capabilities to defensive solutions. 
The RefCat structure is based in part on the model presented in the paper, "A Unified 
Model for System Security Engineering" (Llanso & Engebretson, 2016). Figure 9 is a sum-
mary of the elements above, using a simplified version of Unified Modeling Language nota-
tion (Object Management Group, 1999). 
 
Figure 9: Summary of the RefCat Model (UML) 
A few notes on the figure are as follows: Entities can be missions, cyber-enabled as-
sets, and data processed by assets on behalf of missions. Offensive capabilities threaten assets 
in a many-to-many relationship. Defensive solutions can mitigate offensive capabilities. A de-
fensive solution consists of a set of defensive capabilities mapped to a defensive solution or 
mapped indirectly via defensive Groups. A defensive group specifies a set of defensive capa-
bilities that are often used together. A defensive model (not shown, but present in the RefCat) 
consists of a specific set of defensive capabilities that models a particular cyber adversary 
(e.g., country X, organization Y) or a particular class of adversaries (e.g., Defense Science 
Board (DSB) tier 3 (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013)). The RefCat can have many defensive mod-
els that represent different subsets of the defensive capabilities recorded in the RefCat. A de-
fensive model consists of a set of defensive solutions and their related defensive capabilities 
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Methods 
This section presents the three major BluGen methods: Exposure, Criticality, and Miti-
gation. 
Exposure Method 
In BluGen, we leverage the capability-based representation to define that an entity has 
higher exposure to anticipated cyber threat actors if it is threatened by a greater number of of-
fensive capabilities for which there are no corresponding set of mitigating defensive capabili-
ties. The Exposure method computes this quantity as presented in Equation 1. 
 
 
Table 5 contains a legend of the symbols used in the exposure and criticality equa-
tions. 
Table 5: Equation Symbols 
Symbol Meaning 
M Missions in the criticality input data (𝑚 ∈ 𝑀) 
A Assets in the criticality input data (𝑎 ∈ 𝐴) 
D Data types in the criticality input data (d ∈ 𝐷) 
OCa Offensive capabilities that threaten an asset type, a (oc ∈ 𝑂𝐶) 
𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑐 Defensive solution to mitigate defensive capability oc 
𝐴𝐵𝑜𝑐  Ability (either solution or defensive group) 
present(dc) 1 if defensive capability is present for mitigating threat to a; else 0 
𝑚𝑤(𝑚𝑖) Mission weight for the i
th mission 
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡(𝑚𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗, 𝑑𝑘) Mission criticality score for the given data (d) processed by the given asset (a) 
on behalf of the given mission (m) 
max(…) Entity with the highest criticality 
weight Effectiveness of a given solution 
As Equation 1 shows, the Exposure method considers each entity in the system, look-
ing up its corresponding entity type in the RefCat. It then searches for all applicable offensive 
capabilities that are mapped to assets of the given type. Next, for each offensive capability, 
∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴,  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒(𝑎) =  
∑ max(∀𝑑𝑠 ∈ 𝐷𝑆𝑟𝑐
𝑂𝐶𝑎
𝑜𝑐  ∑ (𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑐
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑟𝑐
𝑎𝑏 . 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ∙  𝑑𝑐. 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ∙ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑑𝑐)))
|𝑂𝐶𝑎|
  
Equation 1: Exposure Method 
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the method seeks the "best" defensive solution available in the RefCat to mitigate the offen-
sive capabilities, among potentially many solutions available. The best solution is identified 
by scoring each candidate solution. This is done by summing up the products of the defensive 
capabilities required for the solution that are present in the current system times the overall 
solution effectiveness ('weight' in the equation). Lastly, the sum is divided by the number of 
solutions available to yield a mean effectiveness, which is registered as the overall exposure 
score for the entity. Figure 9 shows an abstracted example of the exposure analytic. 
 
Figure 10: Exposure Analytic Example 
In the example (Figure 10), the exposure analytic iterates through the Project model, 
considering each asset instance in turn. For a given asset, the analytic looks up the corre-
sponding asset in the reference catalog, finding Asset Type X. Next, it looks up the offensive 
capabilities that threaten assets of that type, finding OC1, OC2, OC3. Then, for each offensive 
capability, the analytic looks up the defensive solutions that are available to mitigate the of-
fensive capabilities, finding DS1, DS2, DS3, and DS4. Next, the analytic looks up the defen-
sive capabilities that contribute to each of the blue solutions, finding DC1-DC8. The analytic 
then cross references each defensive capability to see if it is present in the Project model and 
is mapped to the corresponding asset instance (meaning it is the identified defensive capabil-
ity contributing to the mitigation of red capabilities that threaten such assets). The green check 
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marks () indicate that the defensive capability-to-asset mapping exists, while the red X’s 
() indicate the mapping is absent. The number on a mapping from a blue solution to an of-
fensive capability represents an estimate of the effectiveness of the blue solution in mitigating 
the corresponding offensive capability. The number on a mapping from a defensive capability 
to the corresponding solution represents the weight of the capability’s contribution to the 
overall solution. A number that is underlined means that the capability is required for the so-
lution to be effective at all. 
Figure 11 below shows the calculations for the exposure example discussed in Figure 
10. The weight of each defensive capability is multiplied by the effectiveness of the overall 
defensive solution to produce a score. The score is set to zero if any defensive capability re-
quired by the solution is missing in the Project model. Summing the scores for each blue solu-
tion for each offensive capability results in a coverage score for the blue solution. These are 
highlighted in yellow in the figure. For each threat, one minus the coverage score produces 
the exposure. The overall exposure for the asset is the arithmetic mean of the exposure scores 
for each offensive capability (0.55 in this case). 
 
Figure 11: Calculation for the Exposure Example 
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Criticality Method 
In BluGen, an entity is defined as mission-critical if a greater number of highly 
weighted missions rely on the entity and a greater number of highly critical data types are pro-
cessed there. The Criticality method computes this quantity as shown in Equation 2. 
 
 
The criticality of a given asset is the sum of raw criticalities in the Environment that 
are processed by that asset, scaled by the weights associated with the missions that depend on 
the asset. The final criticality of an asset is expressed as a ratio of the highest criticality of any 
asset in the target Environment, thus all Environments will have at least one asset with value 
1.0. An abstracted example of the criticality analytic is given in Table 6. 
Table 6: Criticality Analytic Example 
 
Table 6  is mission criticality data from a target environment description provided as 
part of the input project supplied to BluGen. In this simple example, there are four missions, 
M1-M4, each with a corresponding mission weight. Mission weight indicates the relative im-
portance of a given mission compared to other missions supported; BluGen expects the 
weights sum to 1.0. The environment processes three data types, D1-D3, and the data for each 
∀𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑒) =  
∑ ∑ 𝑚𝑤(𝑚𝑖
|𝐷|
𝑗=1 ) ∙ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡(𝑒,  
|𝑀|
𝑖=1 𝑚𝑖,  𝑑𝑗)
max(𝑟𝑐(𝑒))
  
Equation 2: Criticality Method 
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mission is mapped to each of the four asset instances (A1-A4). Computing the overall critical-
ity of each asset involves summing up the weighted criticality of each data type processed by 
each asset for each mission, where such a mapping exists. The sum of the results is then com-
puted, resulting in ‘raw criticality’ for each asset. The final overall asset criticality is simply 
the ratio of each raw criticality to the highest raw criticality among the assets considered. 
Thus, one asset will always have a criticality of 100% using this method (asset A3 in this ex-
ample).  
Mitigation Method 
The Mitigation Method, which is a logical extension of the exposure method, recom-
mends mitigations that are currently missing in the target Environment based on the antici-
pated threat. For each entity in the Environment, the mitigation method looks up the corre-
sponding entity type in the RefCat. Then, for the given entity type, the mitigation method 
looks up the offensive capabilities possessed by the anticipated adversary that threaten entities 
of the given type. For each of the offensive capabilities identified, the mitigation method then 
looks up candidate defensive solutions that map to the given defensive capability. Solutions 
are assigned a given level of effectiveness, expressed as a percentage, with respect to a given 
defensive capability. The mitigation method selects the most effective solution and reports a 
list of the defensive capabilities associated with that solution that are not already implemented 
in the target Environment. 
Instantiation 
We created an initial instantiation, Version 1.0, of the BluGen framework imple-
mented in the Java programming language with file storage in Java Script Object Notation 
(JSON) files. The JSON files contain the RefCat and the environmental/project data.  
Exploring the Hypotheses 
To test our hypotheses, we carried out a comparative study involving the risk analysis 
of a ground system for a geosynchronous satellite. For ease of reference, we refer to the 
ground system as “Omega.” The study evaluates the hypotheses by comparing analysis results 
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from BluGen and a representative, manually scored event-centric method. We refer to the 
event-centric method as EVRA, short for Event-based Risk Analysis4.  
Description of Target System to be Analyzed 
Working with a team of experts in aerospace systems engineering, we prepared a de-
tailed description of a ground system that controls a geosynchronous satellite and its payloads. 
Omega was created as part of an earlier research project. The overall mission of Omega is 
Space Situational Awareness (SSA). The SSA mission has, in turn, two sub-missions: (1) op-
tical sensing of objects in space and (2) communications of SSA data to various parties. To 
keep the example openly publishable, the ground system design is a composite of many real 
ground systems, but the description is not specific to any single ground system. An overview 
of the ground system architecture appears in Figure 12. The ground system consists of many 
interconnected cyber components, including controller workstations for the satellite itself and 
each of the two satellite payloads. The payloads on-board are an optical sensor and a commu-
nications transponder. In addition to the hardware and software components identified in the 
figure, the system also consists of a number of roles that people play to control the satellite 
and its payload as part of carrying out the SSA mission. Examples of roles are the sensor 
manager, communications manager, and satellite ops (operations) manager. 
                                                 
4 Analysts have applied EVRA in over twenty studies, covering both concept-level and fielded systems. 
EVRA includes an automated tool that provides bookkeeping assistance when logging the manually-scored at-
tacks. The tool also generates risk plots based on these scores. 
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Figure 12: Ground System 
Summary information about the architecture in Figure 12 is given in Table 7. As indi-
cated, there are 994 unique entities and relationships in Omega. 
Table 7: Entity/Relationship Counts in Omega 
Entity/Relationship Count 
Missions 2 
Cyber-related asset instances 33 
Unique asset types 13 
Data types 26 
Asset-to-asset mappings (containment) 32 
Asset-to-asset mappings (capability inheritance) 80 
Data-to-asset mappings 283 
Unique existing mitigations 38 
Existing mitigations-to-asset mappings 204 
Unique Mission-Data Type-Asset combinations 283 
Total Entity Count 994 
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Table 8 summarizes the two missions supported by the ground system shown in Fig-
ure 12. The information consists of three attributes: a unique identifier (ID column), the name 
of the missions (Name column) and the relative importance assigned to each mission (Mission 
Weight column). The relative importance of each mission is represented by a weight value, 
0.0 ≤ weight ≤ 1.0, under the constraint that the relative mission weights must sum to 1.0. The 
weighting information informs EVRA SAs and the BluGen criticality analytic of mission im-
portance when determining the criticality of assets. 
Table 8: Missions 
ID Name Mission Weight 
M1 Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers 0.6 
M2 Provide Space Observations to SSA Data Customers 0.4 
Figure 13 shows the portion of the RefCat asset type taxonomy relevant to Omega.  
 
Figure 13: Subset of Asset Type Taxonomy Referenced by Omega 
Table 9 augments Figure 13 to include four attributes: (1) a unique identifier (ID), 
(2) the asset type name, (3) the description of the asset type, and (4) the ID of the parent asset 
type (PID), if any, for the given asset type. Note that the asset type matches an existing asset 
type in the asset type taxonomy in the RefCat. 
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Table 9: Asset Types Descriptions 
ID 
Asset Type 
Name 
Summary Description PID 
1 Asset 
Anything that has value to an organization (other than missions and 
data), including, but not limited to, another organization, person, com-
puting device, information technology (IT) system, IT network, IT cir-
cuit, software (both an installed instance and a physical instance), vir-
tual computing platform (common in cloud and virtualized compu-
ting), and related hardware (e.g., locks, cabinets, keyboards). 
(nil) 
45 
Aggregate As-
set 
An asset that is a container for other assets.  1 
5 
Endpoint De-
vice 
A non-embedded device primarily for use by one user or a group of 
users (e.g., workstation) 
4 
4 
Computing 
Device 
A machine (real or virtual) for performing calculations automatically 
(including, but not limited to, computer, servers, routers, switches, 
etc.). The computing device must be IP addressable (or addressable 
via an equivalent network protocol). 
1 
29 
Authentication 
Mechanism 
A combination of hardware and/or software designed to authenticate 
passwords, tokens, biometric and/or other information to identify the 
user of an account or other resource. 
1 
22 Link 
A communications medium between two communicating computers, 
without intermediary computing devices. Does not include the ex-
posed interfaces on either end-point. 
1 
7 
Network De-
vice 
A non-embedded computing device (other than cross domain solu-
tions) that supports the interconnection of other devices via circuits to 
form a network; and/or controls/limits the flow of information on that 
network. As such, network devices are responsible for the layers 3 
and/or 4 of the OSI Model. 
4 
23 Wired-Link Includes all non-RF links 22 
15 Role 
All relevant roles that people play with respect to a given target sys-
tem. 
1 
16 General User 
Includes all persons with any role. The larger the size of this group 
(and/or the degree to which their allowed access/behavior is less lim-
ited), the more likely that the group as a whole has moderate to high 
impact. 
15 
41 
Non-High As-
surance De-
vice 
A computing device that is not embedded hardware or high assurance 4 
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ID 
Asset Type 
Name 
Summary Description PID 
19 Non-IT Role 
Includes persons in roles where the holders need training regarding 
physical access, even though they do not access the IT network. This 
could include cleaners, drivers and others who have information about 
physical security controls, trash, or who might see information on a 
whiteboard, desk, or printer. The role holder may be an employee, 
contractor, a family member, or other confidant. 
15 
18 
Security Ad-
min Role 
Includes persons in roles to perform cyber security related functions. 
These roles are almost always of the highest impact, if compromised. 
15 
17 
System Admin 
Role 
Includes persons in roles to perform system administrative functions 
(apart from mission specific applications). These roles almost always 
have high impact. 
15 
38 Physical Space 
A campus, building, floor, suite, room, rack, vehicle, deck, etc. that 
contains cyber assets. 
1 
34 
Cryptographic 
Mechanism 
A combination or hardware and/or software designed to manage the 
encryption/decryption of data and control who has the keys necessary 
to perform these operations. 
1 
46 
Endpoint 
Cryptographic 
Mechanism 
A cryptographic module, a key storage mechanism, and other parts 
needed to implement a cryptographic mechanism (except key manage-
ment) on a computing device 
34 
35 
Key Manage-
ment Mecha-
nism 
A part of a cryptographic module that distributes keys (e.g., directly or 
through certificates) and limits access to appropriate accounts/person. 
34 
Table 10 shows the asset instances found in Omega. The table includes references to 
the types of each asset instance. Asset types are shown above in Figure 13 and Table 9. 
Table 10: Assets Instances and Their Types 
ID Name Asset Type ID Name Asset Type 
A01 
Ground Control Seg-
ment 
Aggregate Asset A18 Premise Router Link Wired-Link 
A02 Type 1 Link Crypto Aggregate Asset A19 Data Switch 1 Link Wired-Link 
A03 Admin Controller Endpoint Device A20 Comms Manager General User 
A04 
Comms Payload Con-
troller 
Endpoint Device A21 
Satellite Ops Man-
ager 
General User 
A05 Satellite Ops Controller Endpoint Device A22 Sensor Manager General User 
A06 
Sensor Payload Control-
ler 
Endpoint Device A23 System Maintainer Non-IT Roles 
A07 Storage Server 
Computing De-
vice 
A24 Security Admin 
Security Admin 
Roles 
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ID Name Asset Type ID Name Asset Type 
A08 Authentication Service 
Authentication 
Mechanism 
A25 System Admin 
System Admin 
Roles 
A09 Premise Router Network Device A26 
Ground Segment 
Physical Access 
Control 
Physical Space 
A10 
Ground Control-Ground 
Entry Point Comms 
Wired-Link A27 Sat Ops Crypto 
Endpoint Cryp-
tographic Mech. 
A11 Network Link Wired-Link A28 SSA Data Crypto 
Endpoint Cryp-
tographic Mech. 
A12 
Ground Segment Net-
work Switch 
Network Device A29 GEP Crypto 
Endpoint Cryp-
tographic Mech. 
A13 Admin Controller Link Wired-Link A30 Data Switch 1 Network Device 
A14 
Comms Payload Con-
troller Link 
Wired-Link A31 Data Switch 2 Network Device 
A15 
Satellite Ops Controller 
Link 
Wired-Link A32 
Key/Certificate 
Management 
Key Manage-
ment Mecha-
nism 
A16 
Sensor Payload Control-
ler Link 
Wired-Link A33 Storage Server Link Wired-Link 
A17 
Authentication Service 
Link 
Wired-Link    
Table 11 lists information about the twenty-six data types processed by assets in 
Omega. The information consists of two attributes: a unique identifier (ID column) and the 
names of the data types. 
Table 11: Data Types 
ID Name ID Name 
D01 Captured Observations D14 Telemetry 
D02 Comms Traffic D15 Repository Data 
D03 Processed Observation Data D16 Spacecraft Operations Plan 
D04 Space Vehicle Commands D17 Tasking Information 
D05 Time Slot Assignment D18 Onboard Clock Adjustment 
D06 
Access Request for Flight Support Access 
Node 
D19 Telemetry and Command Archive Logs 
D07 Communications Configuration Commands D20 Telemetry Requests 
D08 Customer Communications Requests D21 Authentication Data 
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ID Name ID Name 
D09 Customer Observation Requests D22 Authorization Data 
D10 Sensor Configuration Commands D23 GEP Control Data 
D11 Sensor Observation Schedule Commands D24 Sat Ops Key Material 
D12 Sensor Recalibration Commands D25 Comms Traffic Key Material 
D13 Calibration Data D26 GEP Control Key Material 
The tables above define the missions, asset instances, and data types in Omega. Next, 
we illustrate various relationship mappings present in the ground system. Table 12 shows a 
sampling of asset-to-asset mappings, of which there are two kinds: (1) aggregation mappings 
to show which assets are “contained” within other assets and (2) inheritance relationships to 
show which assets inherit capabilities associated with other assets. 
Table 12: Mapping of Assets to Assets (sampling) 
Asset 1 Asset 2 Relationship Type 
A01 A02 Contains 
A01 A03 Contains 
A01 A04 Contains 
A02 A27 Contains 
A02 A28 Contains 
A02 A29 Contains 
A03 A08 Inherits Capabilities From 
A03 A09 Inherits Capabilities From 
A03 A24 Inherits Capabilities From 
Table 13 shows a sampling of mappings between data types and assets. In particular, 
the rows in the table show which assets process the “Captured Observations” data type. 
Table 13: Mapping of Data Types to Assets 
Data Type Asset 
Captured Observations Sensor Payload Controller 
Captured Observations Storage Server 
Captured Observations Ground Control-Ground Entry Point Comms 
Captured Observations Ground Segment Network Switch 
Captured Observations Sensor Payload Controller Link 
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Data Type Asset 
Captured Observations Data Switch 1 Link 
Captured Observations Sensor Manager 
Captured Observations Storage Server Link 
Table 14 shows a sampling of mappings from mitigations to assets. Such mappings in-
dicate to BluGen that a given asset benefits from the corresponding mitigation. 
Table 14: Mapping of Mitigations to Assets 
Mitigation Asset 
Authenticate All Accounts Authentication Service 
Detect and respond (D&R) to moderately-sophisticated techniques in 
social settings Comms Manager 
Detect and respond (D&R) to moderately-sophisticated techniques in 
social settings Satellite Ops Manager 
Detect and respond (D&R) to moderately-sophisticated techniques in 
social settings Security Admin 
Detect and Respond to Authentication Attacks Authentication Service 
Detect and Respond to comprehensive attacks on Weak Commercial 
Crypto, Keys managed/stored with Commercial Tools GEP Crypto 
Table 15 shows a sampling of mappings in which a given data type is processed by a 
given asset in the process of supporting a given mission. For each mapping, mission criticality 
scores are given for three different situations: (1) a breach of data confidentiality (C column), 
a breach of data integrity (I column), and a breach of availability (A column). For Omega, a 
SA manually assigned the scores based on his knowledge of the missions and how the under-
lying system supports those missions. In general, mission experts provide a written rationale 
for their mission criticality scores; due to space considerations, we omitted this information. 
Table 15: Mission Criticality Mappings 
Data Type Asset Mission C I A 
Comms Traffic 
Comms Payload Con-
troller 
Relay Comms Traffic be-
tween SSA Data Customers 
0.7 0.6 0.6 
Comms Traffic 
Ground Control-Ground 
Entry Point Comms 
Relay Comms Traffic be-
tween SSA Data Customers 
0.7 0.6 0.6 
Comms Traffic 
Ground Segment Net-
work Switch 
Relay Comms Traffic be-
tween SSA Data Customers 
0.7 0.6 0.6 
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Data Type Asset Mission C I A 
Comms Traffic 
Comms Payload Con-
troller Link 
Relay Comms Traffic be-
tween SSA Data Customers 
0.7 0.6 0.6 
Comms Traffic Data Switch 1 Link 
Relay Comms Traffic be-
tween SSA Data Customers 
0.7 0.6 0.6 
Comms Traffic Comms Manager 
Relay Comms Traffic be-
tween SSA Data Customers 
0.7 0.6 0.6 
Comms Traffic SSA Data Crypto 
Relay Comms Traffic be-
tween SSA Data Customers 
0.7 0.6 0.6 
Comms Traffic Data Switch 1 
Relay Comms Traffic be-
tween SSA Data Customers 
0.7 0.6 0.6 
Comms Traffic Data Switch 2 
Relay Comms Traffic be-
tween SSA Data Customers 
0.7 0.6 0.6 
Space Vehicle Commands Satellite Ops Controller 
Relay Comms Traffic be-
tween SSA Data Customers 
0.4 0.8 0.8 
Space Vehicle Commands 
Ground Control-Ground 
Entry Point Comms 
Relay Comms Traffic be-
tween SSA Data Customers 
0.4 1.0 1.0 
Space Vehicle Commands 
Ground Segment Net-
work Switch 
Relay Comms Traffic be-
tween SSA Data Customers 
0.4 0.8 0.8 
Space Vehicle Commands 
Satellite Ops Controller 
Link 
Relay Comms Traffic be-
tween SSA Data Customers 
0.4 0.8 0.8 
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Hypotheses Expectations 
Below, we discuss what we expect to find with each of the three hypotheses. 
H1 Expectations 
We argue that H1 (“BluGen results are more repeatable and reproducible compared to 
manual, event-centric methods”) is supported with the following justification: Given that 
BluGen executes a deterministic set of analytics (methods), BluGen will, by definition, pro-
duce the same outputs given the same inputs, a result that is independent of the security archi-
tect (SA) using BluGen. Thus, we argue for repeatability (the same SA using BluGen at dif-
ferent times but with the same inputs will obtain the same outputs) and reproducibility 
(BluGen will produce the same outputs given the same inputs regardless of which SA submits 
the inputs). The utility of this hypothesis is with respect to comparison to manual analysis, 
where human rater variability tends to be a significant issue. Reliability issues tied to human 
raters was discussed in the literature review, including concerns about the use of human raters 
in cyber-related risk assessment (Hallberg et al., 2017). Given the foregoing explanation and 
justification, we consider that H1 has support and will not discuss it further. 
H2 Expectations 
Our expectation for H2 (“BluGen requires less analyst time compared to manual, 
event-centric methods”) is that automated analysis of the type performed by BluGen will exe-
cute in a short amount of time (seconds to minutes) compared to the time required to perform 
similar analysis manually, which experience has shown can take from tens to hundreds of 
hours depending on target system size and complexity. Thus, BluGen total analysis time is ex-
pected to be far shorter than EVRA analysis time when analyzing the same target system. 
This result would support H2. 
H3 Expectations 
Our expectation for H3 (“BluGen provides greater attack surface coverage compared 
to manual, event-centric methods “) is that, on average, BluGen provides greater attack sur-
face coverage than manual event-centric methods. The reasoning is as follows. In EVRA, SAs 
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generally proceed node-by-node5 in the target system and manually assign a score for the esti-
mated level-of-effort (LOE) required to successfully attack the node. The process of assigning 
scores is usually based on a team of around three SAs discussing what they know about the 
nature of each node in question (e.g., its vulnerabilities) and assigning a final score by consen-
sus. In the author’s experience witnessing manual scoring sessions tied to different risk meth-
odologies, while SAs may write down a brief rationale for each score they assign, they are not 
always rigorous during this process. For example, whether due to resource constraints, fa-
tigue, or other reasons, SAs do not always consult and systematically cross reference external 
sources of information (e.g., threat models, asset taxonomies, vulnerability databases, security 
control libraries, mappings between these). Given the complexity of modern cyber systems, 
coupled with the often informal and ad hoc nature of this SA-driven scoring process, we argue 
that gaps in analyzing the attack surface in terms of threat capabilities are almost certain to 
occur. 
To contrast with the manual process described above, approaches like BluGen auto-
matically consider every possible threat capability known to be possessed by the anticipated 
threat actor that is mapped to each of the assets that make up a given node. Of course, BluGen 
is limited to whatever knowledge is currently stored in its RefCat. However, the RefCat is ex-
pected to grow in size and accuracy over time, as additional content is added and as peer re-
view and empirical validation of its content proceeds. 
Comparative Study Details 
As mentioned earlier, we undertook a comparative study to explore the hypotheses. 
Below we lay out a framework for examining the hypotheses for the comparative study. Next, 
we discuss the state of BluGen software tool and reference catalog used in the study. We then 
describe the teams that carried out the respective BluGen and EVRA analyses. Finally, we de-
scribe in detail the data submitted as input to each analysis. 
                                                 
5 A node is a computer-type asset in EVRA parlance. 
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Framework for Examining the Hypotheses 
As discussed earlier, hypothesis H1 is considered to be supported and is not examined 
further. Hypotheses H2 and H3 are fundamentally about comparisons of BluGen to the repre-
sentative manual, event-centric methodology, EVRA.  
Whether using BluGen, EVRA, or some other cyber risk methodology, the high-level 
steps are generally the same. A brief description of those steps appears in Table 16. Our re-
search examined steps 3, 4, and 5 in the table with respect to hypotheses H2 and H3. The re-
maining steps (1, 2, and 6) were not considered because the data related to those steps is the 
same for both analysis methods and is thus considered a constant. The data for steps 1 and 2, 
in particular, were given identically as input for both the BluGen and EVRA methodologies. 
Table 16: Major Cyber Risk Methodology Assessment Steps  
Major Assessment 
Steps 
Brief Description 
1. Collect and 
load data 
Collect and load data on the anticipated threat, description of the target system, 
missions supported by the system, and information about risk tolerance. 
2. Score mission 
criticality 
Score the mission impact if cyber-related effects (e.g., malicious attacks) occur 
in the context of every viable combination of mission, asset, and data. 
3. Prepare “be-
fore” risk plot 
Score attack level of effort (EVRA) or exposure (BluGen) for the correspond-
ing attack (EVRA) or asset (BluGen) for the target system as presented. 
4. Analyze  
mitigations 
Analyze which potential mitigations might help lower risk to a more accepta-
ble level. 
5. Prepare “af-
ter” risk plot 
Score attack level of effort (EVRA) or exposure (BluGen) for the correspond-
ing attack (EVRA) or asset (BluGen) based on the assumed presence of the 
mitigations identified in step 4. 
6. Prepare and 
brief report 
Prepare a report and associated briefing package of the risk assessment results 
and associated recommendations to be briefed to appropriate stakeholders. 
Table 17 identifies the variables associated with H2 and H3 for assessment steps 3, 4, 
and 5. The variables for H3 cut across the three assessment steps. 
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Table 17: Assessment Steps Examined and Their Associated Variables 
 
Hypotheses and Associated Variables for Data Capture 
(variables tracked separate for BluGen and EVRA) 
Major Assessment 
Steps 
H2: 
Time  
H3: 
Coverage 
3. Prepare before 
risk plot 
𝑇𝑃𝐵 - Time to prepare before plot 𝐶𝐴𝑇 - Asset types count 
𝐶𝑂𝐶 - Offensive capability count 
𝐶𝐷𝑆 - Defensive solutions count 
𝐶𝐷𝐶 - Defensive capabilities count 
𝐶𝑀 - Count of mappings 
4. Analyze miti-
gations 
𝑇𝐴𝑀 - Time to analyze mitigations 
5. Prepare after 
risk plot 
𝑇PA - Time to prepare after plot 
Analyzing H2 Data. As the variables in Table 17 imply, to evaluate H2, we tracked 
the time required by SAs to carry out the analysis for steps 3, 4, and 5 for each approach 
(BluGen, EVRA). Tracking was done via spreadsheets and a time reporting system. In addi-
tion, we extrapolated the time values into the future to address the need for reassessment of 
the target system. Reassessment is necessary for nearly all systems, as threat, mission, and 
system all tend to evolve with time, thus limiting the shelf life of earlier assessments. 
Analyzing H3 Data. To evaluate H3, we performed a (1) comparison of the H3 
counts captured in the table (asset types, offensive and defensive capabilities, mitigations, 
mappings) and a (2) qualitative comparison of the same data. In both cases, we note and dis-
cuss differences. We do these steps separately for BluGen and EVRA. The qualitative com-
parison considers the relative nature and quality of the data, with special attention paid to po-
tential gaps. As with H2, we discuss future coverage potential based on an evolving RefCat. 
Approach is Not Statistical in Nature. As discussed in the dissertation proposal, the 
quantitative analysis associated with the comparative study that we pursued is not statistical in 
nature, as one would pursue in formal hypothesis testing. This is because the sample size re-
quired to achieve a reasonable margin of error is, for the dissertation, impracticable both in 
terms our ability to recruit enough qualified SA teams to participate and in funding those SA 
teams for the time required to execute EVRA studies. For a realistic test, we would need at 
least three SMEs per EVRA study, and the study lead would need to be experienced in con-
ducting at least one prior EVRA study. In addition, we note that Hallberg (Hallberg et al., 
2017) already considered scoring variability in risk assessments at the level of individual 
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raters. Thus, rather than attempting to achieve a statistical result, our analysis is instead a 
combination of the quantitative aspects (time and count differences between BluGen and 
EVRA) and the qualitative aspects of the analysis, which examines the differences between 
the two approaches in the context of the hypotheses examined. 
State of BluGen Tool and RefCat 
We used version 1.0 of the BluGen software and a snapshot of the RefCat as it existed 
on June 30, 2017. The state of the BluGen RefCat model used in the comparative study is 
summarized in Figure 14, which is a screen shot from the BluGen software tool. 
 
Figure 14: Overall Counts in RefCat 
The report shown in Figure 14 does not include relationships between capabilities, 
which numbered 558, and relationships between capabilities and asset types, which numbered 
85. Thus, the total number of entities in the Version 1.0 RefCat is 1,048. 
Note that both the BluGen software and RefCat continued to be updated iteratively af-
ter the Version 1.0 release used for this study.  
Hardware Platform for Running BluGen. We ran the BluGen software on a Dell 
Latitude model E5770 laptop with an Intel Core I7-6820HQ CPU running at 2.7 GHz with 16 
GB of main memory and 512 GB of hard disk. On this machine, BluGen was installed as an 
application on the Windows 7 operating system from Microsoft. 
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BluGen and EVRA Team Summaries 
As the BluGen software conducts the risk assessment and mitigation analysis on a tar-
get system automatically, there was no BluGen “team,” per se. The BluGen operator simply 
instructs the software tool to execute the risk plot generation step and then the mitigations re-
port generation step. As discussed earlier, because we were using BluGen version 1.0, the 
software lacks the feature to allow the user to check off the desired recommended mitigations 
based on risk, which is needed to produce the “after” risk plot (the plot produced after ac-
cepted mitigations are assumed to be present). A BluGen RefCat developer and a BluGen 
software developer worked to edit and then reimport the mitigation list. This feature will be 
automated in BluGen 2.0. 
EVRA depends vitally on SMEs for conducting steps such as attack scoring and miti-
gation determination that BluGen performs automatically. We recruited two separate teams to 
execute the EVRA methodology for Omega, with the second team acting as a backup to the 
first team in case the first team was unable to complete the EVRA assessment (e.g., due to 
personnel availability issues).6  We used the results from team one to examine H2 and H3. 
The personnel makeup of both EVRA teams is given in Table 18. 
Table 18: Teams That Executed EVRA 
Team Highest Degree(s) Total Experience 
1 
BS, Computer Science 6 yrs., 4 mo.  
BS, Physics 3 yrs., 2 mo. 
MS, Info. Technology 0 yrs., 3 mo. 
2 
MS, Computer Science 6 yrs., 9 mo. 
MS, Computer Science 3 yrs., 5 mo. 
BS, Math; BS, CS 0 yrs., 3 mo. 
                                                 
6 Having a second team also allowed us to gather anecdotal data concerning the reproducibility aspect 
of hypothesis H1. We note that the level of scoring consistency between the two teams was poor, with the teams 
producing different scores for the same attack context greater than 80% of the time. 
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Inputs to BluGen and EVRA 
This section defines inputs to BluGen and EVRA. These inputs are identical except in 
those cases where there are different input needs between BluGen and EVRA (e.g., the way in 
which risk tolerance values are described). 
Assumed Threat. For our analysis of Omega, we assumed a Tier VI adversary, as de-
fined by the Defense Science Board (DSB) report titled “TASK FORCE REPORT: Resilient 
Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat” (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013). Table 19, 
taken from page 22 and 23 of the report provide brief overview descriptions of the capabilities 
of the population of threat actors, which can be nation-states, organizations, or individuals, di-
vided among six different tiers.  
Table 19: DSB Threat Tier Definitions (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013) 
Tier Description 
I 
Practitioners who rely on others to develop the malicious code, delivery mechanisms, and 
execution strategy (use known exploits). 
II 
Practitioners with a greater depth of experience, with the ability to develop their own tools 
(from publicly known vulnerabilities). 
III 
Practitioners who focus on the discovery and use of unknown malicious code, are adept at 
installing user and kernel mode root kits10, frequently use data mining tools, target corpo-
rate executives and key users (government and industry) for the purpose of stealing per-
sonal and corporate data with the expressed purpose of selling the information to other 
criminal elements. 
IV 
Criminal or state actors who are organized, highly technical, proficient, well-funded profes-
sionals working in teams to discover new vulnerabilities and develop exploits. 
V 
State actors who create vulnerabilities through an active program to “influence” commercial 
products and services during design, development or manufacturing, or with the ability to 
impact products while in the supply chain to enable exploitation of networks and systems of 
interest. 
VI 
States with the ability to successfully execute full spectrum (cyber capabilities in combina-
tion with all of their military and intelligence capabilities) operations to achieve a specific 
outcome in political, military, economic, etc. domains and apply at scale. 
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Referring to the table, Tier I is the least capable threat actor, and tier VI is the most ca-
pable. The key assumption underlying the table is that an actor at a given tier n (n > I) pos-
sesses the capabilities at the given tier along with all of the capabilities of actors at lower tiers 
(tiers I through n-1). Thus, for example, a tier III actor possesses the capabilities defined by 
the union of capabilities across tiers I, II and III. Our assumption of a tier VI threat actor fol-
lows from our assertion and that of others (Bateman, 2017) that the most capable nation-states 
could reasonably have an interest in using cyber as a means to disrupt a system like Omega. 
While the DSB report (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013) defines threat tiers, the tier defini-
tions are defined at too high a level for BluGen analytics or EVRA SAs to conduct their anal-
ysis. Both require definition of specific attacker capabilities within each tier. Therefore, to 
supplement the tier definitions, the BluGen RefCat incorporates a capability definition model 
that defines capabilities by tier and by category. The model employs seven categories: 
• Ability to access networks 
• Ability discover and exploit vulnerabilities 
• Ability to defeat cryptography and authentication 
• Ability affect cyber/physical systems 
• Ability to gain physical access 
• Sophistication of cyber command and control 
• Sophistication of human influence 
As an example of a capability, the following is defined for a tier I threat actor in the 
category called “Ability to defeat cryptography and authentication.”  The capability is: “De-
feats weak commercial cryptography and weak passwords.”  The EVRA SA team was given 
access to the capability model based on the DSB tiers. 
In addition to the threat model mentioned above, EVRA SAs and BluGen RefCat SAs 
were given the freedom to consider additional capabilities not currently present in the DSB 
threat capability model. 
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System. The system description consists of an inventory of assets, including hardware, 
software, and people (role) assets. For BluGen, we mapped assets instances to their corre-
sponding types in the BluGen RefCat. The description also includes mitigations (defensive ca-
pabilities) and various mappings: 
• Connectivity: which assets connect to other assets via communications links 
• Containment: which assets contain other assets 
• Mitigation: which defensive capabilities map to which assets 
Other inputs include the following: 
• Mission Criticality: Mission criticality data, as defined earlier in the section 
Project Model. 
• Risk Tolerance: Risk tolerance specifications, which instruct EVRA SAs and 
the BluGen software as to which assets (BluGen) or attacks (EVRA) are in-
scope for active mitigation considerations. Risk tolerance is defined by two 
variables, as follows: 
o Mission Criticality. The mission criticality value on the risk plot above 
which mitigations are to be considered. For BluGen, mission criticality 
is on a scale from 0.0 (no mission impact) to 1.0 (complete mission 
failure). EVRA uses an analogous ordinal scale from 1 to 5. 
o Likelihood of Impact. In BluGen, likelihood is estimated via a metric 
called Exposure, measured on a scale from 0.0 (no unmitigated expo-
sure to the relevant threat capabilities of the anticipated adversary) to 
1.0 (full exposure to the relevant threat capabilities of the anticipated 
adversary). The analogous measure in EVRA is Level of Capability, 
which is an ordinal scale integer from 1 to 6 to identify the DSB threat 
tier of the worst-case adversary that possesses the ability to carry out 
the associated attack event. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents the results of the comparative study described in Chapter 3. We 
begin with a summary of the results for BluGen and EVRA, followed by more detailed results 
for each. Lastly, we discuss the results in the context of hypotheses H2 and H3. 
Summary Results for BluGen and EVRA 
Table 20 presents summary results data for BluGen and EVRA for variables defined 
for hypotheses H2 and H3 in Table 17. Values in the BluGen column for H3 were tabulated 
from a run of BluGen against Omega, the output of which is summarized in Figure 28 on page 
79. We extracted values in the EVRA column from artifacts produced by the EVRA team. See 
page 87 under the section heading “Omega Data Capture and Timekeeping Data”. 
Table 20: Summary Data for Hypotheses H2 and H3 
Area Variable BluGen EVRA 
H2  
(Time) 
𝑇𝑃𝐵 - Time to prepare before plot <1 sec. 14.30 hrs. 
𝑇𝐴𝑀 - Time to analyze mitigations <1 sec. 5.25 hrs. 
𝑇PA - Time to prepare after plot 12 hrs. 5.40 hrs.  
Totals ~12 hrs. 24.95 hrs. 
H3 
(Cover-
age) 
𝐶𝐴𝑇 - Asset types count 13  11 
𝐶𝑂𝐶 - Offensive capability count 48 32 
CDS - Defensive solution count 86 N/A 
𝐶𝐷𝐶 - Defensive capabilities count 47 16 
𝐶𝑀 - Count of mappings 
OffCap→Asset Type 129 45 
DefCap→OffCap 303 N/A 
DefCap→DefSolution 383 N/A 
DefCap→Asset Type N/A 16 
𝑪𝑴 Total 815 61 
Totals 1,009 120 
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The abbreviations in the mappings portion of the table are: OffCap—Offensive capa-
bilities, DefCap—Defensive Capabilities, and DefSolution—Defensive Solutions. The source 
of data for the BluGen data is  
Table 21 documents key assumptions and characteristics of the Omega analysis, as 
conducted via BluGen and EVRA. We note that the way in which SAs actually apply EVRA 
tends to vary from team to team, driven in part by time/funds available and the personality of 
the team (e.g., whether the team has the patience and endurance to conduct very detailed anal-
ysis).  
Table 21: Assumptions / Characteristics of the Analyses 
# Assumptions / Characteristics BluGen EVRA 
1 Considered data types during risk scoring Yes No  
2 Referred to an explicit threat model Yes Yes 
3 Maximum assumed threat Tier VI Tier VI 
4 Mapping of offensive capabilities to asset types Explicit Implicit 
5 Mapping of defensive capabilities to offensive capabilities  Explicit Implicit 
6 
Defensive capability course (RefCat =explicit, SA=im-
plicit) 
Explicit Implicit 
7 Analysis includes consideration of different user roles Yes No 
8 SAs scored EVRA Transit Level of Capability (LOC) N/A No 
9 Starting nodes (assets) selected in analysis N/A 
All nodes  
(computers) 
10 Attack vectors explicitly considered N/A Yes 
Explanatory notes on Table 21 are given in Table 22. Values in the # column of Table 
22 map back to the corresponding numbered row in Table 20.  
Table 22: Explanatory Notes for Table 21 
# Notes 
1 
The BluGen criticality analytic consults data type information when rolling up criticality 
scores for 3-tuples of (mission, asset, data-type). Some EVRA teams look at all combina-
tions of mission/asset/data. The team was unable to consider this data due to limited project 
scope. 
2 
One advantage that the EVRA team had that teams in the past have generally not had is that 
we gave the team a copy of a capability-based threat model to work from for LOC scoring. 
The BluGen threat model in the RefCat is a superset of this model. 
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# Notes 
3 
The DSB Tier VI (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013) worst-case adversary was used for both 
BluGen and EVRA. 
4/5/6 
The use of the term “Implicit” means that the corresponding information came from the 
heads of the SAs themselves and informal discussions that they had with one another; the 
consensus results of those discussions were summarized in informal rationale comments rec-
orded by the SA team. The use of the term “Explicit” means that the corresponding infor-
mation was explicitly recorded in the BluGen RefCat. 
7 
For time saving reasons, this particular EVRA team chose to ignore multiple user roles and 
considered one administrative role only. 
8 
For time saving reasons, this particular EVRA team chose not to explicitly score “transit” 
LOCs just using target LOCs in their place. 
9 
The EVRA team considered all nodes in the system as possible starting nodes for attacks. 
Other EVRA teams sometimes pick just a subset of nodes for this purpose, usually for time 
savings reasons. 
10 
Attack vectors (e.g., supply chain, over the network, physical access) are an aspect of offen-
sive capabilities in the BluGen RefCat. In EVRA, SAs have the option of considering them 
or not as part of the definition of an attack context. 
BluGen-Specific Results 
We present the BluGen analysis in this section, beginning with screenshots of the 
BluGen tool after it has been run against the Omega example. The “before” risk plot (meaning 
before any new mitigations are assumed to be applied) appears in Figure 15. The pink shaded 
region in the upper right-hand portion of the figure is the region of unacceptable risk, which 
the SA specifies by two input parameters shown at the bottom of the figure: Criticality and 
Exposure, set in this case to the values 0.50 and 0.25, respectively. These figures taken to-
gether mean that any asset instance that has both a criticality score of at least 0.50 and an ex-
posure score of at least 0.25 must be mitigated. The SA considers the risk to the missions 
from cyber attacks against those assets to be unacceptable. Note that the legend for the assets 
shown was not fully implemented in this version of BluGen (distinct assets types are sup-
posed to have their own unique icon). 
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Figure 15: BluGen “Before” Risk Plot 
Figure 16 provides a screen shot of the BluGen interactive mitigations report; note the 
scroll bar on the right. The report extends many pages. 
 
Figure 16: Mitigations Report 
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 The report has one row per asset. The criticality and exposure scores for each asset 
are shown, with values that exceed the corresponding risk tolerance parameter indicated in 
red. For each asset, the report shows the red (offensive) capabilities that threaten assets of the 
corresponding type and the “best” blue (defensive) solution available to mitigate the threat. 
Also shown are the blue capabilities that make up each solution along with a checkmark that 
indicates whether the mitigation is currently present or not in the target system.  
As mentioned earlier, version 1.0 of the BluGen software does not support the feature, 
planned for version 2.0, by which a user may selectively choose the mitigations that BluGen 
recommends for a given target system, threat, and risk tolerance level and instruct the tool to 
incorporate those mitigations into the model as though they are in place. This feature allows 
the SA to easily one or more “after” risk plots, show risk under a given set of mitigations. As 
version 1.0 of the software lacks this feature, the BluGen team manually entered the updated 
mitigations into the project model and then re-ran the mitigations report. As this was the first 
time the team had done this, some consultation was required, which took approximately 12 
hours total to cover discussions on the best approach, execute the required query, do the man-
ual editing of the mitigations import file, and reimport the file into a revised project. 
More information on BluGen data for Omega can be found in Appendix A - Addi-
tional Information on BluGen. The appendix includes screen shots and discussion of the 
BluGen software tool itself as well as special software written to extract the actual coverage 
data processed by the tool during Omega analysis. 
EVRA-Specific Results 
We present the EVRA analysis in this section. After the SA’s completed their LOC 
scoring, they entered those scores along with mission impact scores into the tool so that it 
could conduct path analysis and generate the risk plot. During path analysis, the software 
looks at each path from a given starting node in the architecture to a given target node in the 
architecture, scoring the paths in terms of the SA-provide scores on the LOC for each node 
along each path. The EVRA tool has no understanding of mitigations, and so does not recom-
mend them, a major difference with BluGen. Instead, the SA’s meet and manually rescore 
based on mitigations that they devise. 
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Figure 17 shows the risk plot generated by the EVRA software tool. The number 
shown by each circle in the plot represents the number of attack contexts that had the same 
mission impact and LOC scores. The size of the circle is proportional to the number of attack 
possibilities. The LOC scale is tied to the DSB levels and is thus inverted, so that high-im-
pact, low-capability attacks cluster in the upper right-hand portion of the figure. Color coding 
emphasis the seriousness of the attacks, with red being the most “risky”. 
 
Figure 17: EVRA Risk Plot 
More information on EVRA itself as well as Omega scoring artifacts and timekeeping 
data can be found in Appendix B - Additional Information on EVRA. 
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Discussion  
This section discusses the results in the context of hypotheses H2 and H3. For ease of 
reference, we repeat the wording of hypotheses H2 and H3 here: 
• H2: BluGen requires less analyst time compared to manual, event-centric methods 
• H3: BluGen provides greater attack surface coverage compared to manual, event-cen-
tric methods. 
Hypothesis H2 
In the case of BluGen, we found that the three time-related variables, TBP, TAM, and 
TPA, all took less than one second to execute on the Dell Latitude laptop described earlier. As 
discussed in the section above, however, BluGen version 1.0 required manual reentry of the 
mitigation specifications before running the second risk plot, an activity that took 12 hours. In 
the upcoming 2.0 version of BluGen, this feature will be built into the software, and the user 
will simply check off the desired mitigations to be incorporated in automated reanalysis. 
Nonetheless, even considering the time required to manually edit and reimport the external 
project file, the total time (TBP + TAM + TPA) for the BluGen risk assessment of Omega was 
still less than half the time required to accomplish the same task by the EVRA team (12 hours 
vs. 24.95 hours, respectively). In BluGen version 2.0, the time should drop considerably, 
equating to the time that the SA takes to check a series of boxes indicating whether or not to 
accept proposed mitigations, which we anticipate to be on the order of a few minutes7. Thus, 
we anticipate support for H2 will grow as further automation comes to BluGen in version 2.0. 
In consideration of the total time values, we find support for H2.  
The total time for an EVRA type analysis is actually magnified by the fact that target 
systems need to be reevaluated at intervals, such as annually. Reevaluation is needed because 
the nature of the cyber threat, the mission(s) that a target system supports, and the target sys-
tem itself, all co-evolve in time, thus limiting the shelf life of any given risk analysis result. 
                                                 
7 This time excludes the time the SA takes to think through implications of selecting different mitiga-
tions, which arises whether BluGen, EVRA, or any other risk method is being used. 
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Ultimately, a desire to assess risk in ‘real time’ makes the time required to conduct EVRA-
style manual analysis untenable. 
Hypothesis H3 
For H3, the total coverage for BluGen amounted to 1,009 distinct entities vs. 120 for 
EVRA. Those figures represent totals for the variables CAT, COC, CDC, and CM, per Table 20. 
Stated another way, EVRA SAs only considered approximately 12% of the entities compared 
to BluGen. In consideration of the total coverage values, we find support for H3. 
The H3 data for BluGen reflects the state of the RefCat at the time the comparative 
study was executed. However, as a knowledge repository, RefCat is intended to be under con-
tinuous evolution as new cyber asset types are introduced, new offensive capabilities are iden-
tified, and new defensive solutions to mitigate the offensive capabilities are designed. In fact, 
as of this writing (February 2018), the RefCat has grown to 8,953 entities, which is 8.5 times 
larger than Version 1.0 RefCat used during this dissertation (current as of Summer 2017), 
which was 1,048 entities. As catalogs such as the RefCat grow in time, the percentage of their 
content that SAs can reasonably expect to retain “in their heads” so that they can conduct 
manual risk scoring as they do today is expected to continue dropping. Thus, over the long 
term, we believe that support for H3 will continue to grow. 
 In addition to a far richer RefCat, RefCat data quality is expected to improve over 
time as its contents undergo further peer review and empirical data validation. The idea be-
hind this is that the eventual goal for the RefCat is to host it on servers accessible to the cyber-
security community at large. In this setting, the RefCat will be available not only for reuse but 
also for peer review of its contents. It is our expectation that data quality will improve through 
the peer review process, much as academic paper quality can improve when authors take inde-
pendent reviewer comments into consideration when updating their papers. A level beyond 
peer review is taking into consideration empirical data from the “real world” cyber environ-
ment (e.g., the results of cyber incident response and forensic investigations) and cross refer-
encing that data with data in the RefCat. Assertions in the RefCat can then be squared against 
the empirical data, acting as another form of quality control. For example, incident data from 
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sensors in major government agencies collected over several months might reveal that the ef-
fectiveness of a certain defensive solution recorded in the RefCat is actually lower than the 
SA-set effectiveness score for the solution in the RefCat (e.g., the effectiveness score might 
indicate 80% effective, but a large volume of incident data might reveal that the solution is ef-
fective only 40% of the time). 
Validities 
In this section, we consider the validity of the research described above. Valid re-
search is, per Trochim, et al., “the best available approximation to the truth of a given propo-
sition, inference, or conclusion” (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008).  
Effort to Create the RefCat and RefCat Sharing with EVRA Team 
Before reviewing specific kinds of validities, we first take up a possible point of objec-
tion in the manner by which BluGen and EVRA are compared. Specifically, one could argue 
that while EVRA is a manual method, so too, indirectly, is BluGen, in the sense that the 
BluGen RefCat is, at least initially, a product of manual (SA) effort. Therefore, an ostensibly 
fairer comparison of BluGen and EVRA for the time element explored in H2 would have to 
include the time in BluGen required to manually create the RefCat. Likewise, a seemingly 
fairer comparison with respect to H3 would involve providing the BluGen RefCat to the SAs 
for their own reference while executing EVRA. We argue, however, that these concerns are 
misplaced. 
With respect to H2, it is certainly true that the RefCat took time to initially create, and 
it will likewise take time to maintain and extend the catalog into the future. That said, we ex-
pect that this effort will be amortized over hundreds to thousands of automated BluGen anal-
yses that otherwise would have had to have been conducted manually otherwise. In this way, 
BluGen and its RefCat act as force multipliers.  
With respect to H3, while one could provide a copy of the RefCat to SAs as an aid to 
conduct manual scoring, the goal of BluGen is to replace the need for manual scoring and to 
provide a means to mitigate the issues that tend to go along with it (reference the prior discus-
sion on this topic and work by Hallberg (Hallberg et al., 2017)). In addition, EVRA represents 
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current practice. We did not want to distort current practice in the context of examining our 
hypotheses. 
Face Validity 
A weak form of validity is Face Validity, the extent to which a construct or artifact 
like BluGen makes sense to others “on the face of it.” (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). We argue 
for face validity for BluGen in terms of the reactions we have repeatedly experienced when 
presenting core BluGen concepts to others in the cyber field, specifically, its capability-based 
nature, its focus on assets, and its particular depiction of risk, including the concept of threat 
exposure8. The approach appears to readily appeal to the intuition of others who are experi-
enced in the cyber risk assessment field.  
Instantiation Validity 
Lukyanenko, et al. (Lukyanenko, Evermann, & Parsons, 2014) introduced the concept 
of Instantiation Validity for Design Science Research, which they define as “the extent to 
which an artifact is a valid instantiation of a theoretical construct or a manifestation of a de-
sign principle.” They further state that “Instantiation validity is analogous to the concept ... of 
construct validity in survey research.” 
We argue for instantiation validity in the sense that the instantiation of BluGen, and in 
particular, the implementation of the Exposure, Criticality, and Mitigation methods were 
painstakingly hand-checked by the research team in February and March 2017 against the ab-
stract expression of those methods (equations and corresponding pseudo code). Thus, we have 
confidence that the instantiation reflects those design concepts.  
                                                 
8 Since 2016, we have briefed BluGen to a variety of audiences, including HICSS (conference paper), a 
risk assessment workshop at APL, the International Test Evaluation Association, the US Space Community, and 
various departments and agencies of the US government.  
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External Validity 
External validity considers whether the results we obtain from our comparative study 
generalize to other contexts. Below, we discuss the following threats to external validity: 
• The target system does not generalize to other system types  
• Time results related to h2 do not generalize to larger systems 
• EVRA does not generalize to other risk assessment methods 
• EVRA team does not generalize to other teams 
Threat: Target system does not generalize to other system types. We conducted 
our comparative study against a single target system, the Omega space ground system. The 
question is whether we can generalize our results to other target systems that BluGen might be 
called upon to analyze. Having an insufficient sample size (e.g., a sample of one) would nor-
mally be considered a threat to external validity. However, while data from additional investi-
gations conducted against other system types would be welcomed, we do not expect that the 
results would be materially different in other settings based on the nature of the two hypothe-
ses that we are assessing: time savings and increased coverage.  
Threat: Time results related to H2 do not generalize to larger systems. With re-
spect to other system sizes, we have attack and node-related data on eleven previously exe-
cuted EVRA selected risk assessment studies completed since 2009, as shown in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18: Attacks Analyzed vs. System Node Counts 
In this context, the term “node” equates to “computer,” a general kind of asset in 
BluGen parlance. As the graph shows, the number of attacks chosen by SAs to analyze and 
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score has tended to grow as a roughly linear function of the number of cyber nodes in the tar-
get system. As the score for a given attack generally requires a discussion among SAs, the 
more attacks to be scored, the more total time required to conduct the required discussions. 
We thus argue that our time results should remain valid across systems of different sizes, as 
measured by total node count, thus supporting H2 for other systems. 
The nature of the BluGen exposure algorithm is on the order of O(n) with worst case 
O(n2), where n is the number of assets. The criticality analytic has similar complexity. We 
base the complexity estimate on the four major nested loops of the exposure algorithm. Below 
is a simplification of the nested loop procedure: 
• Loop A: Consider each asset instance in the environment (n items) 
• Loop B: Consider each offensive capability mapped to the asset’s type (m items) 
• Loop C: Consider defensive solution mapped to the offensive capability 
• Loop D: Consider each defensive capability mapped to the defensive solution 
We regard the processing time for Loops B, C, and D as equating to a constant factor. 
On average, we expect that the number of offensive capabilities (Loop B) mapped to an asset 
instance, m, to be less than 100; the current maximum is 96 and the mean is 34.  We expect 
the number of solutions mapped to an offensive capability (Loop C) to be low (<10) and the 
number of defensive capabilities mapped to a defensive solution (Loop D) to be even lower 
(<5) on average. These numbers are based on our experience populating the RefCat thus far. 
Thus, in summary, the computational complexity of exposure is on the order O(n) or linear 
complexity. 
Threat: EVRA does not generalize to other risk assessment methods. Another pos-
sible threat to the external validity is our choice of the comparison methodology, EVRA. If 
EVRA is not truly representative of attack-based methodologies, against which H2 and H3 
comparisons are made, then the argument for external validity is weakened.  
However, EVRA conforms to the overall model of the NIST 800-30 Framework 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012), which is a commonly accepted ap-
proach and a key part of the broadly cited RMF. One notable variance from 800-30 is 
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EVRA’s use of Level of Effort (LOE)9 in place of likelihood of successful attack on the Y 
axis. However, we argue that LOE is a legitimate proxy for likelihood in much the same way 
that we argue that BluGen’s exposure method is proxy for likelihood. Other methodologies 
depend on similar arguments. Indeed, until the community moves away from subjective SA 
scoring and can collect and analyze sufficient empirical attack data from which to establish 
frequentist probabilities to support a probability-based Y axis, such arguments are the best we 
currently have. 
To contrast, the analytics that conduct analogous scoring in BluGen operate at ma-
chine speeds against data sets that are orders of magnitude smaller than what one would con-
sider to be on the scale of “big data.” Thus, we do not expect the set of BluGen algorithms 
that implement the analytics to encounter a times/space wall for more complex cyber systems 
than those we have thus far analyzed. 
Threat: EVRA team does not generalize to other teams. Table 18 identified the team that 
executed the EVRA assessment. To evaluate this threat, our main point of comparison is the 
previously mentioned work of Hallberg (Hallberg et al., 2017). Like the twenty survey re-
spondents in Hallberg’s research, the EVRA team members all possess university degrees and 
have a range of cyber assessment expertise and experience. Hallberg’s respondents ranged in 
age from 29 to 64 years, whereas the EVRA team members are all under 30. A potential limi-
tation to the EVRA team, then, is years of experience, which operates under the premise that 
additional years of experience correlates to increased expertise for security risk assessment. 
However, we note that Hallberg concluded the following:  
“…it cannot be stated that experts have a higher consensus than non-experts when 
the probability and the severity of information security incidents are rated.” 
                                                 
9 In some applications of EVRA, such as that described in this dissertation, the SAs score Level of Ca-
pability (LOC) rather than Level of Effort (LOE). The former refers to levels of cyber offensive capability in a 
capability-based threat model, whereas LOE refers to the SA’s estimate of “effort” (resources-time/money). 
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Other Validities: Internal, Construct, Convergent, and Discriminant 
H2 and H3 are about comparing selected quantities (time/coverage) between BluGen and 
EVRA. We argue that internal validity does not apply, as we are not attempting to establish 
causality in these hypotheses. Likewise, as we are not directly testing a theoretical model in 
those hypotheses, construct, convergent, and discriminant validities do not apply. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
In 2018, the cyber risk assessment and mitigation process tends to be an SA-intensive 
effort that is slow, expensive, and has generally poor reproducibility. We again quote Hall-
berg (Hallberg et al., 2017): "The ratings of probability and severity are not reliable enough 
between raters to be considered a sound basis for the quantification of information security 
risks." However, given the ubiquity and critical uses to which cyber is increasingly put, we 
suggest that the importance of reliable and timely cyber risk assessment results has never been 
greater. Our original research question was: 
“Is there a new approach to mission-cyber risk assessment that can signifi-
cantly close the following gaps associated with what is typically seen in manually 
executed assessments: improved repeatability and reproducibility of results ("re-
peatability/reproducibility gap"), improved coverage of the attack surface ana-
lyzed ("coverage gap"), and decreased analyst time required ("time gap”)?”  
In this dissertation, we introduced BluGen, an automated risk assessment approach 
that, rather than attempting to enumerate vulnerabilities and possible attack events, focuses 
instead on underlying attacker capabilities and computes asset exposure to those capabilities 
along with a rolled-up level of mission consequence. We asserted that BluGen could address 
the gaps in the research question. To explore whether the evidence supported the assertions, 
we conducted a comparative study that focused on a target space system, comparing BluGen 
and a representative attack-centric methodology called EVRA. The basis of comparison cen-
tered on three hypotheses tied to the gaps in the research question above (repeatability/repro-
ducibility, time, coverage). Our investigation found support for the hypotheses. 
It is our hope that the contribution of BluGen to the knowledge base will help the field 
of cyber risk assessment and mitigation to become more systematic in its approach and more 
apt to leverage collected cyber knowledge rather than relying solely on the judgments of indi-
vidual SAs. 
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Much work remains to be done. In the context of BluGen, the following elements rep-
resent a sampling of areas of possible future work. 
(1) Formal Hypothesis Testing. To strengthen external validity of the hypotheses H2 and 
H3, formal hypothesis testing in a controlled experiment could be pursued. 
(2) Utility of BluGen to SAs. The perceived utility of BluGen to working SAs could be 
assessed using survey methods. 
(3) Assess Utility of Mitigation Recommendations. Experimental tests of the degree to 
which implementations of the mitigation recommendations from BluGen hold up 
against anticipated threat actors could be evaluated. 
(4) Explore Empirical Validation of BluGen RefCat. One could evaluate the process of 
empirical validation of RefCat contents using actual cyber incident data. 
(5) Willingness to Review and Contribute. A study to examine the extent to which the 
broader cyber community is willing to reuse, contribute to, and peer review BluGen 
RefCat content could be undertaken.  
(6) Use of BluGen for other Threat Types. The expansion of BluGen to other threat 
types besides cyber (e.g., kinetic threats, electromagnetic threats) could be examined. 
At issue would be how well BluGen analytics and BluGen’s capability-based represen-
tation of threats and mitigations work. 
(7) Real-Time BluGen. An examination of the degree to which BluGen could be extended 
to do “real-time” risk assessment could be undertaken. Such a tool could be driven by 
data from live update feeds of threat data and system configuration data. 
(8) Tradespace Analysis. Tradespace analysis of possible capability-based mitigation ar-
chitectures is a rich area for possible future investigation. In this context, one could 
build a recommendation engine that selects mitigations not just on the basis of the per-
ceived effectiveness of individual defensive solutions, but on the effectiveness of over-
all mitigation architectures composed of those solutions, taking into consideration vari-
ous SA-weighted measures of cost and benefit. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A - Additional Information on BluGen 
Appendix A provides additional information on BluGen, broken into two sections:  
(1) setting up and running BluGen and (2) BluGen data capture. We do not summarize 
BluGen itself, as that was done in the earlier section called Artifact Design and in the 2017 
HICSS paper (Llanso et al., 2017). 
Setting Up and Running the BluGen Software 
BluGen software is managed in the SVN repository, which should already be installed. 
To check out the software, follow these steps: 
1. Create an empty folder. Below, I called it BluGen-1.0Demo 
2. Change directories to the folder 
3. Right-click mouse and choose “SVN Checkout…” 
 
4. The dialog box below appears. Enter the appropriate URL and then click OK. The 
checkout process will commence. 
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5. The checkout process takes several minutes. When the process is complete, the following 
window contents will appear. 
 
The folder appears as follows once the checkout is complete. 
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6. Start the NetBeans IDE (version 8.2 used below), choose Open Project… from the File 
menu, which results in the dialog below. Then choose “trunk” in the file list. 
 
For the sake of brevity, we do not show the installation process for installing the 
BluGen software nor do we show the importation process for Omega descriptive data10.  
To start the BluGen tool, the user double-clicks the mouse on the BluGen icon on the 
desktop (Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: Desktop with BluGen icon 
The tool starts up and presents the user with a list of projects (Figure 20). A project is 
a description of a target system to be analyzed. Omega has already been loaded into a project 
called “Space Example”. 
                                                 
10 To import the data, the user prepares a multi-tab spreadsheet populated with descriptive data for 
Omega. The user then executes a command in BluGen to load this data into a newly created BluGen project.  
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Figure 20: BluGen Projects 
To view details about the risk analysis of Omega, the user selects the “Space Exam-
ple” project with the mouse and clicks the “Open” button. The corresponding project window 
opens (Figure 21). Note the multi-tab interface for the project description. The main tab, 
shown below, captures the project name, description, threat model to use, tier of threat actor 
to consider, and risk tolerance values. 
 
Figure 21: Project Windows – Main tab 
 
Figure 22 shows a view of the entity tab for Omega. Entities include missions, assets, and data 
types. The window shows only a subset of the entities in Omega. 
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Figure 22: Project Windows – Entity Tab 
Figure 23 shows a view of the entity relationships tab for Omega. For example, one of 
the entity relationship types is “InheritsCapabilitiesFrom,” which indicates that an asset inher-
its the defensive mitigations from another asset. 
 
Figure 23: Project Windows – Entity Relationships Tab 
Figure 24 shows the mission criticality scores for Omega. The user provides this data 
as input to BluGen. Each row of data in the table shows mission impact scores for breach of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability for each viable combination of (Mission, Asset, and 
Data). 
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Figure 24: Project Windows – Criticality Tab 
Figure 25 shows the analysis tab for Omega. The analyst clicks on the various buttons 
to run BluGen analytics. The buttons used for this analysis are the buttons to generate a risk 
plot and to generate a mitigations report. 
 
Figure 25: Project Windows – Analysis Tab 
Figure 26 show a risk plot generated for Omega. Each data point in the scatterplot rep-
resents an asset in the Project model provided to BluGen. 
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Figure 26: Risk Plot Generated for Omega 
Figure 27 shows a portion of the mitigation report BluGen generates for Omega. Each 
row in the table represents an asset. Mitigation possibilities for the asset are shown on the 
right-hand side of the report. 
 
Figure 27: Mitigation Report Generated for Omega 
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Omega Data Capture 
This section discusses dissertation data capture. In this context, by data, we mean pro-
cessing data generated by the BluGen tool needed for evaluating hypothesis H3. We first 
show the custom code that we wrote to extract the data, and then we show the data itself. 
Custom Source Code for Dissertation Hypothesis H3 (BluGen) 
For the dissertation, I wrote custom source code to capture data processed by the 
BluGen exposure analytic as it worked its way through computing exposure for assets in 
Omega. This code, which is not part of the main BluGen source code base, is shown in below. 
package jhuapl.edu.blugen.ui; 
 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.HashMap; 
import jhuapl.edu.blugen.EntityTypeTaxonomyManager; 
import jhuapl.edu.blugen.ReferenceCatalogManager; 
import jhuapl.edu.blugen.model.EntityType; 
import jhuapl.edu.blugen.model.EntityTypeTaxonomy; 
import jhuapl.edu.blugen.model.refcat.Ability; 
import jhuapl.edu.blugen.model.refcat.Ability2Ability; 
import jhuapl.edu.blugen.model.refcat.ReferenceCatalog; 
 
/** 
 * This code was written by Thomas H. Llanso in support of his dissertation. 
 *  
 * @author Thomas H. Llanso 
 */ 
public class Dissertation { 
     
    /** 
     * This method traverses the reference catalog for each asset type found in the  
     * Space Example project, showing coverage and collecting descriptive  
     * statistics along the way. 
     */ 
    public void execute() { 
            EntityTypeTaxonomyManager ettm = EntityTypeTaxonomyManager.getInstance(); 
            EntityTypeTaxonomy att = ettm.getEntityTypeTaxonomy(); 
            ReferenceCatalogManager rcm = ReferenceCatalogManager.getInstance(); 
            ReferenceCatalog rc = rcm.getReferenceCatalog(); 
 
            System.out.println("******* BluGen Dissertation Output *******"); 
 
            int assetTypeCount = 0; 
            ArrayList<Ability> rcList = new ArrayList<>(); 
            ArrayList<Ability> bsList = new ArrayList<>(); 
            ArrayList<Ability> bcList = new ArrayList<>(); 
            int[] mappings = new int[3]; 
 
            for (EntityType et : att.getEntityTypes().values()) 
                if (dissertation_assetTypeWasUsed(et)) { 
                    dissertation_ShowCoverageForEntityType(rc, et, rcList, bsList,  
                            bcList, mappings); 
                    assetTypeCount++; 
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                } 
            System.out.println("\n         ---> STATISTICS <---"); 
            System.out.println("            Asset Types (AT) count: "+assetTypeCount); 
            System.out.println("   Offensive Capability (OC) Count: "+rcList.size()); 
            System.out.println("     Defensive Solution (DS) Count: "+bsList.size()); 
            System.out.println("   Defensive Capability (DC) Count: "+bcList.size()); 
            System.out.println(""); 
            System.out.println("           OC --> AT Mapping Count: "+mappings[0]); 
            System.out.println("           BS --> RC Mapping Count: "+mappings[1]); 
            System.out.println("           BC --> BS Mapping Count: "+mappings[2]); 
        } 
 
    /** 
     * THis method returns TRUE if a given asset type was used in the Space Example. 
     *  
     * @param et Asset type to lookup 
     * @return TRUE if present, FALSE if not. 
     */ 
    boolean dissertation_assetTypeWasUsed(EntityType et) { 
        // Entity types in Space Example 
        String[] aList = { 
            "Aggregate Asset", 
            "Authentication Mechanism", 
            "Computing Device", 
            "Endpoint Cryptographic Mechanism", 
            "Endpoint Device", 
            "General User", 
            "Key Management Mechanism", 
            "Network Device", 
            "Non-IT Roles", 
            "Physical Space", 
            "Security Admin Roles", 
            "System Admin Roles", 
            "Wired-Link" 
        }; 
        boolean found = false; 
        for (String name : aList) { 
            if (name.equalsIgnoreCase(et.getName())) { 
                found = true; 
                break; 
            } 
        } 
        return found; 
    } 
 
        /** 
         * Show the coverage for a given asset type. 
         *  
         * @param rc Reference Catalog to use 
         * @param entityType Asset type to show coverage for 
         * @param rcList Accumulating list of offensive capabilities 
         * @param bsList Accumulating list of defensive solutions 
         * @param bcList Accumulating list of defensive capabilities 
         * @param mappings Accumulating list of mappings between entities 
         */ 
        void dissertation_ShowCoverageForEntityType( 
                ReferenceCatalog rc, 
                EntityType entityType, 
                ArrayList<Ability> rcList, 
                ArrayList<Ability> bsList, 
                ArrayList<Ability> bcList, 
                int[] mappings) { 
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            System.out.println("\nASSET-TYPE: "+entityType.getName()); 
 
            // Show red capabilities and corresponding blue solutions and component blue capabilities 
            for (Ability redAbility : rc.getRedAbilitiesThatThreatenEntityType(entityType, null, true)) { 
                dissertation_addAbility(rcList, redAbility); 
                mappings[0]++; 
 
                System.out.println("      OC: "+dissertation_trim(redAbility.getName())); 
                HashMap<Ability, Double> map = rc.getBlueAbilitiesThatCounterRedAbility(redAbility, null); 
                for (Ability bs : map.keySet()) { 
                    System.out.println("            DS: "+ 
                        dissertation_trim(bs.getName().substring(4))); //+" ("+bs.getAbilityCategory()+")"); 
                    mappings[1]++; 
                    dissertation_addAbility(bsList, bs); 
                    ArrayList<Ability2Ability> list = rc.getComposedOf(bs); 
                    for (Ability2Ability a2a : list) { 
                        Ability bc = a2a.getAbility2(); 
                        mappings[2]++; 
                        dissertation_addAbility(bcList, bc); 
                        System.out.println("                  DC: "+ 
                            dissertation_trim(bc.getName().substring(4))); //+" ("+bc.getAbilityCategory()+")"); 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
        } 
 
        /** 
         * Trim output string to no longer than 100 characters 
         *  
         * @param s String to trim 
         * @return s trimmed string 
         */ 
        String dissertation_trim(String s) { 
            final int m = 115; 
            int len = s.length() > m ? m : s.length(); 
            String k = s.substring(0, len); 
            if (k.length() == m) k += "..."; 
            return k; 
 
        } 
         
        /** 
         * Add an ability to the list as long as it is not already on the list. 
         *  
         * @param list list to receive the ability 
         * @param a  ability 
         */ 
        void dissertation_addAbility(ArrayList<Ability> list, Ability a) { 
            boolean found = false; 
            for (Ability i : list) 
                if (i.getName().equalsIgnoreCase(a.getName())) { 
                    found = true; 
                    break; 
                } 
            if (!found) 
                list.add(a); 
        }  
} 
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To summarize the code above, for each asset type that appears in Omega, the code 
shows the offensive capabilities (OC) mapped to the asset types, and, for each threat, the de-
fensive solutions (DS) that mitigate the threat, and the defensive capabilities (DC) that com-
pose those solutions. In addition, the code computes summary statistics at the very end. 
BluGen Output to Show Coverage  
A sampling of the output resulting from a run of the Java code for Omega is shown for 
below. The descriptive statistics that normally appear at the end of the multi-page output is 
instead show in Figure 28 for convenience. 
  
Figure 28: BluGen Descriptive Statics for Omega Coverage 
******* BluGen Dissertation Output ******* 
 
ASSET-TYPE: General User 
      OC: Effectively uses highly-sophisticated techniques in social settings for elicitation 
            DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering Full GR 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G 
            DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R 
            DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR 
      OC: Effectively uses highly sophisticated social engineering attacks 
            DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering R 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G 
      OC: Effectively uses moderately-sophisticated techniques in social settings for elicitation 
            DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation Full GR 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G 
            DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR 
            DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R 
      OC: Effectively uses moderately sophisticated techniques to recruit persons for espionage and sabot... 
            DS: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques 
      OC: Effectively uses highly sophisticated techniques to recruit persons for espionage and sabotage 
            DS: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques 
      OC: Effectively uses rudimentary social engineering attacks 
            DS: Solution to Rudimentary Social Engineering R 
                  DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering R 
            DS: Solution to Rudimentary Social Engineering Full GR 
                  DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering GR 
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            DS: Solution to Rudimentary Social Engineering G 
                  DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering G 
      OC: Effectively uses moderately sophisticated social engineering attacks 
            DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering G 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering G 
            DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering R 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering R 
            DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering Full GR 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering GR 
 
ASSET-TYPE: Endpoint Cryptographic Mechanism 
      OC: Defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
            DS: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto via military Grade Encryption 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption 
            DS: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
      OC: Defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device 
            DS: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device 
      OC: Defeats Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material  
            DS: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material  
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material  
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms that are unprotected 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using cryptography 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using cryptography and physical protections 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using physical access controls 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st... 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with simple protections 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with simple protections using physical access controls 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 2, or less) with ... 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with highly-sophisticated protec... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material  
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical prot... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection, classifi... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5) 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using physical access controls 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti... 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with extra highly-sophisticated ... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with extra highly-sophisticated protections using physical access controls... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with extra highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5) 
      OC: Defeats Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material  
            DS: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material  
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material  
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with rudimentary protections 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using physical access controls 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light physical protection  (Protection 3 or ... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using cryptography 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material  
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with simple protections using cryptography and physical protections 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light physical protection  (Protection 3 or ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material  
      OC: Defeats Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5) 
            DS: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5) 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5) 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with moderately-sophisticated pr... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography reducing vuln... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to  access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption 
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            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls a... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to  access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls b... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls c... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography using stronge... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using cryptography and physical protections a... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to  access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
 
ASSET-TYPE: Network Device 
      OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineering/elicitat... 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineer... 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering GR 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineer... 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering GR 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineer... 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering GR 
      OC: Exploit Known and Unknown Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o... 
            DS: BS: Detect and Respond to exploitation of Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Appl... 
                  DC: BG: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs)  
      OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through basic recruitment through moderately-sophisticat... 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through basic recruitment through moderately... 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques 
      OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering G 
                  DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering G 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering R 
                  DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering R 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering GR 
                  DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering GR 
      OC: Exploit Known and Unknown Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o... 
            DS: BS: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o... 
                  DC: BG: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs)  
      OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engineering/elic... 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engi... 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering GR 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engi... 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering G 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engi... 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering R 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R 
      OC: Exploit Known and Unknown Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o... 
            DS: BS: Limit damage from Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor)... 
                  DC: BG: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs)  
      OC: Can develop and deliver high-stealth SW implants for SW of network appliances and embedded systems 
            DS: Mitigate SW Injection:  SW Hash-Based WL TT4 
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                  DC: Mitigate Malicious and Unauthorized Code emphasis Hash based Whitelisting to block execution 
            DS: Mitigate SW Injection:  SW Black Listing TT4 
                  DC: Mitigate Malicious and Unauthorized Code emphasis Black Listing 
            DS: Mitigate SW Injection:  SW Location WL + Hash-based Removal TT4 
                  DC: Mitigate Malicious and Unauthorized Code emphasis Locational WL with Hash based Removal of Malicious Code 
            DS: Mitigate SW Injection:  SW Locational WL TT4 
                  DC: Mitigate Malicious and Unauthorized Code emphasis Location Whitelisting to block execution 
      OC: Exploit Known Vulnerabilities (CVEs and CWEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) of computers, sma... 
            DS: Mitigate Exploitation of known Vulnerabilities CVEs and CWEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o... 
                  DC: Mitigate Exploitation of known Vulnerabilities CVEs and CWEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o... 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms that are unprotected 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using cryptography 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using cryptography and physical protections 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using physical access controls 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st... 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with simple protections 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with simple protections using physical access controls 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 2, or less) with ... 
      OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through  highly-sophisticated recruitment for espionage/... 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through  highly-sophisticated recruitment fo... 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques 
      OC: Inject Hardware 
            DS: Mitigate hardware injection 
                  DC: Mitigate Hardware Injection 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with highly-sophisticated protec... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material  
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical prot... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection, classifi... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5) 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using physical access controls 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti... 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with extra highly-sophisticated ... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with extra highly-sophisticated protections using physical access controls... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with extra highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5) 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with rudimentary protections 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using physical access controls 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light physical protection  (Protection 3 or ... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using cryptography 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material  
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with simple protections using cryptography and physical protections 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light physical protection  (Protection 3 or ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material  
      OC: Find and Exploit Unknown Vulnerabilities in OS, firmware or application software on computing devices 
            DS: Mitigate Exploitation of unknown Vulnerabilities in OS, firmware or application software on computing devices 
                  DC: Mitigate Exploitation of unknown Vulnerabilities in OS, firmware or application software on computing devices 
                  DC: Mitigate Exploitation of unknown Vulnerabilities in hypervisor software on computing devices 
      OC: Exploit Hardware Vulnerabilities 
            DS: Mitigate hardware vulnerability 
                  DC: Mitigate Vulnerable Hardware 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with moderately-sophisticated pr... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography reducing vuln... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to  access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls a... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to  access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls b... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
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                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls c... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography using stronge... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using cryptography and physical protections a... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to  access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
 
ASSET-TYPE: System Admin Roles 
      OC: Effectively uses highly-sophisticated techniques in social settings for elicitation 
            DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering Full GR 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G 
            DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R 
            DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR 
      OC: Effectively uses highly sophisticated social engineering attacks 
            DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering R 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G 
      OC: Effectively uses moderately-sophisticated techniques in social settings for elicitation 
            DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation Full GR 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G 
            DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR 
            DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R 
      OC: Effectively uses moderately sophisticated techniques to recruit persons for espionage and sabot... 
            DS: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques 
      OC: Effectively uses highly sophisticated techniques to recruit persons for espionage and sabotage 
            DS: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques 
      OC: Effectively uses rudimentary social engineering attacks 
            DS: Solution to Rudimentary Social Engineering R 
                  DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering R 
            DS: Solution to Rudimentary Social Engineering Full GR 
                  DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering GR 
            DS: Solution to Rudimentary Social Engineering G 
                  DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering G 
      OC: Effectively uses moderately sophisticated social engineering attacks 
            DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering G 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering G 
            DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering R 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering R 
            DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering Full GR 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering GR 
 
ASSET-TYPE: Computing Device 
      OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineering/elicitat... 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineer... 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering GR 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineer... 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering GR 
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            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineer... 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering GR 
      OC: Exploit Known and Unknown Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o... 
            DS: BS: Detect and Respond to exploitation of Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Appl... 
                  DC: BG: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs)  
      OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through basic recruitment through moderately-sophisticat... 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through basic recruitment through moderately... 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques 
      OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering G 
                  DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering G 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering R 
                  DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering R 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering GR 
                  DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering GR 
      OC: Exploit Known and Unknown Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o... 
            DS: BS: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o... 
                  DC: BG: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs)  
      OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engineering/elic... 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engi... 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering GR 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engi... 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering G 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engi... 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering R 
                  DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R 
      OC: Exploit Known and Unknown Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o... 
            DS: BS: Limit damage from Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor)... 
                  DC: BG: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs)  
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms that are unprotected 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using cryptography 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using cryptography and physical protections 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using physical access controls 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st... 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with simple protections 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with simple protections using physical access controls 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 2, or less) with ... 
      OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through  highly-sophisticated recruitment for espionage/... 
            DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through  highly-sophisticated recruitment fo... 
                  DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques 
      OC: Inject Hardware 
            DS: Mitigate hardware injection 
                  DC: Mitigate Hardware Injection 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with highly-sophisticated protec... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material  
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical prot... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection, classifi... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5) 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using physical access controls 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti... 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with extra highly-sophisticated ... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with extra highly-sophisticated protections using physical access controls... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with extra highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5) 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with rudimentary protections 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using physical access controls 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light physical protection  (Protection 3 or ... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using cryptography 
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                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material  
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with simple protections using cryptography and physical protections 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light physical protection  (Protection 3 or ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material  
      OC: Exploit Hardware Vulnerabilities 
            DS: Mitigate hardware vulnerability 
                  DC: Mitigate Vulnerable Hardware 
      OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with moderately-sophisticated pr... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography reducing vuln... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to  access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls a... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to  access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls b... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti... 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls c... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography using stronge... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using cryptography and physical protections a... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to  access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
            DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis 
 
ASSET-TYPE: Physical Space 
      OC: Can obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
            DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth 
      OC: Can obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protection 3-4) with mod... 
            DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti... 
      OC: Can obtain physical access  to classified systems with light physical protection  (Protection 3 or less) with minim... 
            DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light physical protection  (Protection 3 or ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light physical protection  (Protection 3 or ... 
      OC: Can obtain physical access  to cryptographic mechanisms and keys (Protection 2.5, or less) with no stealth 
            DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to cryptographic mechanisms and keys (Protection 2.5, or less) with no ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to cryptographic mechanisms and keys (Protection 2.5, or less) with no ... 
      OC: Can obtain physical access  to  access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high stealth 
            DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to  access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to  access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s... 
      OC: Can obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection, classified systems in SC... 
            DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection, classifi... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection, classifi... 
      OC: Can obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal stealth. 
            DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st... 
      OC: Can obtain physical access  to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 2, or less) with moderate stealth... 
            DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 2, or less) with ... 
                  DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access  to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 2, or less) with ...  
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Appendix B - Additional Information on EVRA 
This appendix provides additional information on EVRA. The appendix is divided into 
two sections: (1) a brief summary of the EVRA methodology and (2) detailed results and 
timekeeping data for EVRA during its application on the comparative study. 
Summary of EVRA Methodology 
EVRA analyzes (1) a set of mission/business objectives that depend on a cyber sys-
tem, (2) cyber threats that could impact mission/business objectives by attacking the underly-
ing system, and (3) details of the cyber system upon which the mission/business objectives 
depend. The process is intended to help answer three key questions:  
(1) If a threat action was carried out, what would be the mission impact be? 
(2) What adversary level of capability (LOC) is required, as estimated along the DSB 
scale from I to VI (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013)? 
(3) What mitigation options for are available to deal with the threats, particularly those 
that have low LOC and high mission impact?  
The EVRA processes (Figure 29) maps well to the NIST risk assessment framework 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012). One difference is that whereas EVRA 
uses LOC, NIST uses likelihood of attack. We believe, but lack the empirical data to strongly 
support, that LOC correlates to likelihood of attack. The reasoning is that (1) attacker motiva-
tion is assumed and (2) by possessing sufficient LOC, attack likelihood goes up. 
 
Figure 29: Summary of the EVRA Methodology 
An overview of Figure 29 is as follows. First, SAs obtain data to populate the adver-
sary, mission, and system models. Next, SAs score a set of potential attacks and estimate risk 
using the models. Scoring is along a 5-point Likert-style ordinal scale. SAs score attack LOC 
and mission impact if the attack is successful. Then the scoring data is entered into a tool 
which produces the initial EVRA risk plot. After deciding on possible mitigations and 
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rescoring LOC scores appropriately given the hypothetical presence of the mitigations, the 
SAs rerun the EVRA tool to obtain an “after” risk plot. The results are then shared with other 
stakeholders for decisions on the way forward. As threat, mission, and system change over 
time, the entire process iterates. 
Omega Data Capture and Timekeeping Data 
This section presents detailed results and timekeeping data for the EVRA team. Table 
23 shows the scoring table the EVRA team used to record starting node LOC scores and the 
corresponding rationale the team recoded for each score.  
Table 23: EVRA Starting LOC Scoring and Rationale 
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Table 24 shows the shows the scoring table the EVRA team used to record target node LOC 
scores and the corresponding rationale for each score. 
Table 24: Target LOC Scores and Rationale 
 
Notes kept by the EVRA team during their analysis of Omega are given in Figure 30. 
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Figure 30: Notes from EVRA team 
Table 25 contains the total hours by day for the EVRA team over the seven-day period 
in which they conducted the EVRA analysis of Omega. As shown, the team spent a total of 
24.95 hours on the task, with 14.30 hours spent on choosing and scoring attacks for the “be-
fore” risk plot (BP) and 10.65 hours on selecting mitigations based on the “before” plot and 
scoring LOC assuming the mitigations are in place. 
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Table 25: Timekeeping for EVRA Team 
Values in the Category column of Table 25 have meanings defined in Table 26, as recorded 
by the EVRA team.  
 
Table 26: Timekeeping Categories for EVRA Analysis 
 
